What Maduro’s Capture Says About China–U.S. Flashpoints

Tuzhuxi, The China Academy, January 4, 2026 —

An influential Chinese commentator weighs in on how China can study Trump’s behavior and inform its own strategy.

Trump has just sent U.S. troops to bomb Venezuela, claiming that they have seized Maduro and will take him back to the United States for trial. The international community is in an uproar. The U.S. Congress was completely in the dark (it was not notified in advance). Escalating the conflict also lacks public support in the United States. But none of this matters, because Trump believes everything is under his control.

1. Trump’s “sphere of influence” logic:
Trump’s logic in the Western Hemisphere is one of spheres of influence: “I can do whatever I want here.” The unspoken implication is that what other countries do within their own spheres of influence is none of America’s business.

2. Does international law still exist?
In Trump’s view, international law simply does not exist. He does not recognize international law, nor does he believe in it; he recognizes only power, and spheres of influence built on power. If you have strength, then fight; if you don’t, then shut up.

3. Is Trump a “Monroe Doctrine” figure?
Calling Trump a practitioner of the “Monroe Doctrine” is also inaccurate. The Monroe Doctrine held that Europe should not interfere in U.S. affairs, and the U.S. should likewise not interfere in European affairs—each continent minding its own business. Trump, however, sees Europe as America’s backyard and seeks to intervene in European domestic politics. So he is not a Monroe Doctrine proponent, but rather one of regional hegemonism.

4. Is this the first war of 2026?
There is no need to rush to call this the first “war” of 2026. In the U.S. view, bombing a bit and grabbing one person hardly counts as a “war”—at least not within the American discourse. Of course, this is framed by the Trump administration as part of the “War on Drugs.” Americans see this as an ongoing condition, much like the “War on Terror.” They oppose one-on-one wars with other countries, but show a higher tolerance for this kind of perpetual “campaign.”

5. What does the MAGA base want?
On foreign policy, the core demands of the MAGA base center on strong opposition to three things. First, they oppose U.S. involvement in “endless wars” abroad. Second, they oppose the United States engaging in regime change in other countries—because this not only brings enormous uncertainty, but also severely distracts politicians from focusing on domestic livelihoods, which ordinary people believe should be the priority. Third, they oppose any form of postwar nation-building in other countries—because this requires massive overseas resource investment and diverts resources away from domestic needs. These are Trump’s binding constraints, and essentially the only issues he truly cares about. Based on this, several points follow.

First: How Trump explains “not fighting endless wars.”
Trump will avoid actually launching what counts as a real “war.” As noted above, in the American understanding, only ground-force invasions and territorial occupation constitute a true “war.” Bombing drug traffickers’ boats does not count as a “war”; airstrikes (against the Houthis in Yemen, against Syria, against Iran) do not count as “war”; special forces assassinations or capture operations do not count as “war” either (the killing of Iran’s Soleimani was not a war; going into Pakistan to kill bin Laden was not a “war”; and the “arrest” of Maduro would not be a “war” either).

Second: How Trump explains “not doing regime change.”
He will tell voters that this does not count as “regime change”—at least not in the traditional sense. The government largely remains in place; the old parties and political forces are still there; the political system has not changed. Yet the outcome is even better than regime change. After all, what the United States is doing now is different from the CIA-led coups after World War II (when the typical U.S. approach in Latin America was to overthrow an elected government and prop up a military junta).

Third: How Trump explains “not doing nation-building.”
This is the easiest point, because Trump never had absolutely no interest in nation-building in Venezuela to begin with. He would state clearly that there will be no U.S. “nation-building” in Venezuela afterward—at most, U.S. oil companies would enter to pursue some commercial interests.

6. Trump’s small, medium, and large objectives.
So does Trump have goals? Yes.

His small goal is to replace Maduro as a specific individual, because Trump personally dislikes him. This is a matter between Trump and Maduro—much as Trump clashes personally with figures like Lula or Modi. He intensely dislikes Maduro.

His medium goal is to back a Venezuela politician who is friendly to the United States. At the very least, this would serve as a warning to politicians unfriendly to the U.S., showing them that Maduro’s fate is what awaits them.

His large goal is to assert U.S. influence over Venezuela, reducing or even cutting off this major oil producer’s ties with China and Russia, thereby putting his sphere-of-influence worldview into practice. It must be noted that Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves and is a key resource state in the Western Hemisphere. If Trump wants to control the Western Hemisphere, he obviously cannot tolerate a resource-rich power in America’s immediate vicinity maintaining close ties with rival states.

7. What happens next for Trump / the United States?
Most likely, it will be a step-by-step, wait-and-see approach.

Watch how Venezuela’s domestic politics respond—whether they soften or remain hardline—and then decide the next move.

Watch what people across the U.S. political spectrum say, especially his core base. Trump needs to explain this to his base and defuse their concerns.

Watch what allies say, and what the international community says. In particular, observe whether Europe dares to take a stance. Europe is deeply hypocritical, essentially a bunch of useless actors. Most likely, they won’t say a thing. Their silence will only confirm Trump’s view of Europe’s incompetence (as if further confirmation were needed) and encourage him to act even more recklessly. Of course, Europe would not change Trump’s behavior anyway—but if Europe remains completely silent or offers only empty remarks, you can conclude that the international community has effectively collapsed.

Also watch what rival states say and what they can do—for example, Russia and China.

Overall, if the feedback is acceptable, Trump can choose to escalate; if the feedback is very negative (which, judging from the current situation, does not appear highly risky), he can choose to scale back. In short, it all depends on audience reaction—advance or retreat as needed. (The logic of an American TV drama.)

8. What Trump truly worries about.
In reality, Trump worries about only one thing: the opinion of the MAGA base.

It is expected that he will devote a large share of his energy to explaining that this does not constitute a “war,” that the damage and costs to the United States are minimal, that future risks are extremely low, and that the gains are substantial. He will also repeatedly argue that this clever approach (the “arrest” of Maduro) made a much larger invasion, full-scale regime change, and postwar cleanup unnecessary, and is therefore a textbook example of “America First.”

If there is no further escalation, he may well secure the base’s acceptance—much as they grudgingly tolerated Trump’s bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Ultimately, the effect Trump seeks is for this episode to benefit, rather than harm, the midterm elections.

9. Potential flashpoints for China–U.S. conflict
As 2026 begins, one potential flashpoint for a China–U.S. conflict is in fact Latin America. Trump views Latin America as America’s sphere of influence, where the United States should control all key resources and infrastructure and support pro-U.S. governments, while rival states should not interfere. China, however, has close trade and economic ties with major Latin American countries, which could become points of friction going forward. Looking ahead, scenarios of direct China–U.S. confrontation will become increasingly limited; the main arenas of conflict will be these third-party countries.