US bases are not coming back: Iran’s strikes rewrite Washington’s West Asia doctrine
Shivan Mahendrarajah, The Cradle, May 11, 2026 —
Iran’s dismantling of the US base shield exposes the central weakness of Washington’s regional order: its occupation infrastructure can no longer protect itself.
To riff on Bruce Springsteen’s ‘My Hometown’: “Tehran says ‘These bases are going, boys / And they ain’t coming back / To your hometown’.”
The Washington Post’s 6 May 2026 article, ‘Iran has hit far more US military assets than reported, satellite images show,’ was an overdue admission – based on leaks from the US Department of Defense (DOD) and Washington’s intelligence community – that Iran had inflicted significant damage to US assets. However, The Post only tells part of the story.
The Post examined 109 of the hundreds of satellite images published by Iranian media, whose authenticity could be verified “by comparing them with lower-resolution imagery from the European Union’s satellite system, Copernicus, as well as high-resolution images from Planet where available.”
The story was curated to reveal damage to 217 structures and 11 pieces of equipment, highlighting the vulnerability of US bases, while at the same time obscuring the magnitude of the losses and ramifications for the US military presence in West Asia.
It did not address the implications of the destruction of radars, the failure of longstanding US doctrine, or strikes against bases in Iraq – more than 600 – that effectively ejected US bases from the country.
The larger story is that these bases may not be rebuilt at all. They are exposed, ruinously expensive, and now sit inside Iran’s demonstrated strike envelope.
Force protection failed first
“Force protection” is a military doctrine and is enshrined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-10 that binds the uniformed services. US Army Field Manual 3-19.1 clarifies the doctrine:
“Force protection consists of those actions that prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. It coordinates and synchronizes offensive and defensive measures to enable the joint force to perform while degrading opportunities for the enemy. It includes air, space, and missile defense; NBC [Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical] defense; antiterrorism; defensive information operations; and security to operational forces and means.”
Casualties lead to public scrutiny and dissent within the Armed Forces. Hence, the inordinate weight accorded to force protection in the early phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iran’s Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaei has pressed directly on that vulnerability, warning that renewed US aggression could see American vessels sunk, soldiers killed, and large numbers of forces taken captive.
The takeaway is the imperative to protect personnel and families, on or off base. The US was unable to protect either. US Central Command (CENTCOM) is credited with saving service members’ lives by moving personnel off bases and into hotels, but this did not provide much safety. CIA and military were tracked to hotels; Shahid-136 drones made “room service” deliveries in the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain – as evinced by myriad videos on Telegram.
Base protection
Base protection is a subset of force protection. This involves, inter alia, defending bases against missiles and drones – but this cannot be done. West Asian bases developed over decades; the bulk of the expansion came after 2001 to support the post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT). An expressed purpose for the bases – and their post-GWOT retention – was to “contain Iran.”
Iranian missile and drone programs were unsophisticated on 9/11, but consequent to former US President George Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech (29 January 2002), research and development expanded. Since 2002–2003, numerous subterranean missile bases – proven in the Ramadan War to be impenetrable by “bunker buster” bombs – were excavated and constructed.
Iranian technologies in 2026 crushed defensive doctrines and technologies dating back to 2001–2002. How can the US retain bases knowing that Iran’s arsenal is superior? Air defense batteries cannot defend US bases, and the USAF’s firepower cannot suppress Iranian launches.