The Role of the Iran War in the Future of South Korean-Iran Relations

Samyar Rostami, New Eastern Outlook, May 28, 2026 —

А war against Iran could be a test of the new South Korean government’s foreign policy in terms of multilateralism, combining international alliances with a stance of self-reliance and “independence.”

Despite the presence of the South Korean president in Iran in May 2016 and 20 memorandums of understanding, since 2019, the trade, economic, and political relations between Iran and South Korea have weakened due to compliance with US sanctions against Iran.

South Korea’s approach to the US-Israeli war against Iran

A significant part of the importance of Iran in Seoul’s foreign policy is security and geopolitical motives.

South Korea’s abstention from Security Council resolutions on the reinstatement of sanctions and the extension of Resolution 2231 last September and the silencing of the bill condemning Iran in the national parliament indicate that country’s commitment to preventing tension with Iran.

In recent months, South Korea has maintained its embassy in Iran and has tried to keep a balance between US pressure, energy security, and maintaining engagement with Tehran.

South Korea’s official stances during the war against Iran are also noteworthy. In response to the war, Korean officials called for a “bold step toward peace” and emphasized the need to de-escalate the crisis and contain the consequences of the war.

South Korea has taken practical and political steps, such as allocating $500,000 in humanitarian aid to Iran, sending a special envoy to Tehran, and holding consultations between foreign ministers.

Since the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, the security of the Hormuz waterway has become a major concern for South Korea. A total of 26 ships belonging to Korean companies have been stranded in the waterway. Therefore, a kind of diplomatic realism, cautious activism, direct interaction with Tehran, and avoidance of hasty entry into military confrontation with Iran were evident.

In fact, South Korea has avoided military, economic, and diplomatic costs by adopting a middle policy, by maintaining apparent coordination with the United States, without military confrontation with Iran.

Also, in recent months, apart from interaction to manage the energy crisis, the dispatch of a special envoy to Tehran, the conversation between the foreign ministers of Iran and South Korea about Korean ships, the targeting of a Korean ship, and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz highlighted the importance of maintaining and developing relations.

While Washington has called on US allies to play a greater military and security role in securing the Strait of Hormuz and energy routes, Seoul has not taken an immediate, military, and maximum pressure stance.

As South Korea has previously stated, the deployment of naval ships to form a coalition to ensure safe passage through Hormuz requires domestic legal approval.

In another dimension, condemning the attack on the Korean cargo ship flying the Panamanian flag (HMM Namu) on May 4 was while Tehran has categorically denied any role. In fact, Korea is seeking an “appropriate response” from Iran, ensuring the swift and safe passage of all ships, and ways to resolve the problem of its stranded ships through consultations with Iran.

South Korea is among America’s strategic allies, but it seems that with the war against Iran and the ineffectiveness of Washington’s security umbrella for its partners in the Middle East, Seoul has begun to think about military independence from American hegemony. The scope of consultations between South Korea and the United States clearly shows the direction of a change in the type of alliance.

Although a South Korean destroyer was dispatched to the waters near the Somali coast, the possibility of Seoul’s “phased” participation in US-led or French-British-led operations in the Strait of Hormuz has become much less likely.

Furthermore, if the South Korean government decides to join the Western coalition in the Strait of Hormuz, the support of the National Assembly and critical public opinion is also needed.

Tehran’s Expectations

Although South Korea considers Iran’s plan for the Strait of Hormuz to be against its interests, from Iran’s perspective, the Strait of Hormuz is considered “part of Iran’s defense geography.” Therefore, safe passage through this waterway requires “full compliance with regulations and coordination with Tehran.”

In a recent month, Ebrahim Azizi, the head of the National Security Committee of the Iranian Parliament, in a telephone conversation with the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the South Korean Parliament, considered South Korea’s refusal to participate in military operations in the Strait of Hormuz a wise move in order to maintain regional stability.

However, many in Tehran believe that several billion dollars of Iranian assets in South Korean banks have been blocked under the pretext of US unilateral sanctions, and Seoul should not be influenced by the political games of a third country.

Moreover, if South Korea is interested in preserving its long-term interests in Central and West Asia, implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the idea of ​​a trans-Asian railway, and the possibility of rail transport between South Korea, Russia, China, Central Asia, or Iran, it will have to open up channels of dialogue with Tehran.

Apart from the complementary economic role of Iran and South Korea for each other, the new Korean government is a historic opportunity to reset relations, and Iran is also ready to open a new chapter in relations with an engagement-oriented approach.

From this perspective, initial agreements to unblock Iranian funds are important for advancing relations, can prevent widespread divergence in relations, and paint a more positive picture.

In the meantime, regular dialogue between political officials, the formation of a joint parliamentary commission between the two countries, the establishment of a consultative mechanism in crisis situations, a focus on cooperation in non-sanctioned and low-risk areas, the activation of private sector diplomacy, direct communication between chambers of commerce, and the separation of issues can help reduce disputes and misunderstandings.

Outlook

The shocks resulting from the Iran war, high fuel prices, the energy crisis and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and restrictions on the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have seriously endangered South Korean interests.

The South Korean government has faced a complex challenge in regulating its relations with Iran and the United States. Certainly, siding with the West in any regional tensions could have consequences, including jeopardizing South Korea’s interests and damaging its relations with Tehran.

It seems that the new Korean government’s foreign policy will prioritize national interests, and while maintaining its alliance with the United States, it will emphasize the need to improve relations with China, Russia, and Iran, and seek a more independent role in the Persian Gulf.

However, a war against Iran could be a test of the new South Korean government’s foreign policy in terms of multilateralism, combining international alliances with a stance of self-reliance and “independence.”