The Real Question Isn’t Whether the U.S. Will Strike Iran

Wang Xiangsui & Charriot Zhai, The China Academy, January 27, 2026 —

This analysis argues that U.S. military action against Iran is secondary to the broader strategic contest. America’s “unrestricted warfare”—sanctions, assassinations, support for opposition—aims to bleed Iran into submission. Yet Iran’s religious cohesion and ties with China and Russia provide durable resilience. The real struggle is between hegemonic coercion and constructive multipolarity.

Recently, the United States dispatched additional aircraft carrier strike groups to the Middle East, and social media has been awash with speculation: “Will the U.S. attack Iran?” “Is World War III on the horizon?” It seems as though once America brings down its big stick, Iran, the Middle East—even the entire global order—will be transformed overnight.

But Professor Wang Xiangsui, Deputy Secretary-General of the CITIC Foundation for Reform and Development, offers a different view: whether or not military strikes are launched, the United States will struggle to steer Iran or the broader Middle East in the direction it desires.

Within China’s geopolitical framework, the focus isn’t simply on whether the U.S. and Iran will come to blows this time, or how severe any conflict might be. The starting point is a more fundamental recognition: this escalation is not an isolated incident. It is part of a decades-long, dynamic, multi-round strategic confrontation. Rewind just a few months, and the United States had already carried out military strikes against Iran. Go back further, and the conflict between Israel and Iran teetered on the brink of all-out war. Zoom out even more, and American sanctions and blockades against Iran have dragged on for over a decade. The recent unrest inside Iran is largely the product of economic hardship accumulated under years of sanctions, which has stoked public discontent. Leveraging internal grievances while applying diplomatic and military pressure to achieve “change through coercion”—this is the underlying logic of America’s long game in Iran and the Middle East. The ultimate objective is to preserve a geopolitical arrangement that serves U.S. hegemonic interests in the region.

In the post-World War II era, the United States had the comprehensive strength to deploy this combination punch effectively, concentrating overwhelming pressure on any single point in the Middle East. But two developments now suggest that America’s capacity to pressure Iran has become quite limited—and unlikely to produce the desired results:

The First Development: The U.S. Military Has Grown Cautious

According to CNN reporting on January 15, an informed source revealed that “any such military move would not include boots on the ground,” adding that “the administration does not want protracted military involvement in Iran.”
While the White House national security team remains divided on whether to strike Iran, a glance at recent U.S. military operations reveals just how wary Washington has become.

On January 13, U.S. special forces entered Venezuela and kidnapped President Maduro. If one objects that a far-flung expedition cannot be compared to action closer to home, consider the 1991 Gulf War: the United States mobilized 500,000 troops, unleashed an overwhelming assault on Iraq, and dismantled Saddam’s army in just 42 days.

Yet against Iran, America’s actual moves have been strikingly restrained. There have been airstrikes, yes—but “Operation Midnight Hammer” amounted to surgical “pinpoint” attacks launched only after Iran’s air defenses had been thoroughly neutralized. There have been assassinations, such as the killing of Soleimani in 2020. But a large-scale ground invasion? That isn’t even on the table.

Why? First and foremost, because Iran has the military capability to make any invasion costly.

Iran is a regional power of over 90 million people, with a landmass equivalent to four Iraqs. Its terrain—mostly plateau and mountain—forms a natural defensive fortress. More importantly, Iran has lived under American military threats for decades. The entire country has long operated in a state of “normalized standoff,” with war preparations and resistance system that cannot be dismantled by a couple of airstrikes.

Professor Wang points out: if the U.S. actually went in, it would be Afghanistan all over again. In 2001, American forces invaded Afghanistan and the military occupation went smoothly enough. But what happened twenty years later? The world watched U.S. troops scramble out of Kabul airport in chaos, and the Taliban retook power almost immediately. Iran boasts a more developed industrial base and greater self-sufficiency than Afghanistan. If the U.S. couldn’t pacify Afghanistan, what makes anyone think it can handle Iran?

So yes, the carrier groups have sailed, and the war threats have been issued. But as long as the Trump administration continues to weigh the costs and benefits rationally, the odds of a full-scale ground invasion remain low. Against a mid-sized power like Iran, this level of military pressure falls far short of solving the problem once and for all.

The Second Development: Iran’s Internal Situation Has Stabilized

The Trump administration’s stated rationale for threatening war was the Iranian government “using deadly force against protesters.” But looking at the timeline, the United States has already missed its best window for military intervention.

According to Al Jazeera, by January 16 the protests in Iran had largely died down and domestic security had essentially been restored. Meanwhile, CNN reported that the U.S. carrier battle group was still far off in the South China Sea. PBS noted that Trump’s tone softened accordingly.

In the past, the Western playbook for color revolutions: stir up domestic protests from within, then pile on military pressure from without, had worked time and again. So why does it now seem to be losing its effectiveness in Iran?

To answer that, we need to recognize two often-overlooked sources of Iranian resilience—sources that military strikes or tightened sanctions cannot easily erode:

First: Religion as a Force for Social Cohesion

Western media coverage of Iran’s religious system tends to be sharply critical: theocracy, the oppression of women, and so on. Judged by Western political sensibilities, these criticisms may seem fair enough. But to see only the negatives is to miss something more important: it is precisely this religious system that gives Iran its formidable internal cohesion.

Iran is the heartland of Shia Islam. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the Pahlavi dynasty, religious authority became the glue holding the nation together. The mobilization apparatus built around the Supreme Leader allows Iran, when facing external threats, to frame narratives of “defending the faith to save the nation.”

Once the United States and Israel are cast as enemies of Islamic civilization, resistance ceases to be merely a government affair—it becomes a religious duty for every believer. Washington has tried repeatedly to ratchet up both internal and external pressure, hoping to force overthrow. But that very pressure keeps reinforcing the religiously rooted cohesion and mobilization capacity—a blind spot for many Western observers.

Second: The Survival Instincts of Persian Civilization

Iran is more than a nation-state; it is a civilization spanning millennia. The Persian Empire dates back to the sixth century BCE and has weathered countless invasions and existential threats over the ages. That historical experience has instilled a survival wisdom deep in Iran’s bones: never put all your eggs in one basket, and always keep room to maneuver.

Today, this wisdom shows up in Iran’s deft navigation among the great powers. Though under comprehensive Western sanctions, Iran maintains close ties with both China and Russia, sustaining substantive cooperation in trade, energy, and investment.

This means that however harsh American sanctions may be, they cannot truly seal Iran off or choke it into submission.

Of course, this civilizational instinct for hedging also creates friction. Iran can appear “half-hearted” in its dealings with China and Russia, its stance occasionally wavering. But as Professor Wang notes, China’s partnership with Iran rests on the long-term vision of the Belt and Road Initiative and a shared strategic interest in resisting U.S. hegemony. Cooperation grounded in durable common interests has considerable resilience; it won’t be derailed by minor bumps in the road.

In short, faced with America’s strategy of “change through pressure,” Iran has demonstrated a capacity to “stand firm under sustained pressure.” That resilience stems both from internal factors—religious cohesion and civilizational tradition—and from external ones: great-power backing and strategic breathing room. The United States may be able to impoverish Iran further, but the notion of dismantling its survival strategy altogether is probably wishful thinking.

Beyond the Binary of “Strike or Not”: The Unrestricted Warfare Between China and the U.S. Over Iran

So if we move past the simple binary of “strike or not” and “who wins, who loses,” how should we think about the future of the Iran question? Professor Wang offers a more penetrating lens: Unrestricted Warfare.

What is Unrestricted Warfare? In essence, the boundaries of conflict have expanded far beyond conventional combat. Trade wars, financial sanctions, technology blockades, propaganda campaigns, diplomatic isolation—deployed together, these tools can inflict damage more lasting and far-reaching than any bomb.

America’s economic sanctions have severed Iran from the global financial system. Targeted killings of Iranian officials—most notably Soleimani—have decapitated its military leadership. Support for domestic opposition has sought to destabilize the regime from within. The cumulative intensity of these measures long ago reached the threshold of warfare.

Fixating on “whether America will fire the first shot” is to analyze a 21st-century conflict through a 19th-century lens. In the age of Unrestricted Warfare, America fired its first shot long ago.

Throughout this prolonged unrestricted war, America’s goal has never changed: an Iran that is perpetually weakened, unable to challenge Israel, and poses no threat to U.S. dominance in the Middle East. Washington doesn’t need to destroy Iran outright—it just needs to turn it into a “well-behaved child” that stays quietly on its own turf and accepts the regional order America has drawn.

To that end, the United States will use every tool at its disposal: sanctions to erode Iran’s economic base, military deterrence to drain its strategic reserves, support for opposition groups to shake the regime’s foundations. Whether or not bombs actually fall matters less than keeping Iran bleeding until it finally loses both the ability and the will to resist.

What, then, is China’s logic on the Iran question?

It stands in stark contrast to American hegemonic thinking. China wants to see a stable, developing Iran capable of charting its own course. Practical interests play a part, of course: Iran is a key node in the Belt and Road Initiative and a vital energy partner. Sino-Iranian trade is mutually beneficial cooperation rooted in both sides’ developmental needs.

But at a deeper level, China hopes that cooperation with Iran can demonstrate a different model of international relations—one that breaks from the hegemonic mold.

In China’s vision, the Middle East should be part of a “community with a shared future for mankind,” not any great power’s backyard. Middle Eastern nations should participate as equals in international affairs and pursue economic development within a framework of international law—not be “taught lessons” at will by a stronger power wielding military strikes and sanctions.

Professor Wang observes that even as the United States wages unrestricted warfare against Iran, China is engaged in its own long-term unrestricted warfare with America over Iran—a contest between “destructive hegemony” and “constructive engagement.” This contest will not be decided by the outcome of any single clash.

It is a protracted game that must be measured on the scale of history. And that scale need not stretch as far back as the origins of Persian civilization. Look out fifty years, and the picture may become clear:

The United States can use sanctions to batter Iran’s economy, military threats to keep it on edge, and information warfare to sow doubt about its political system. But one thing it cannot change: the Iranian people’s desire for a better life and a brighter future.

Whatever religion people follow or political system they prefer, the ultimate goal is the same—to live well. A hegemon that knows only how to brandish its stick can inspire fear and enable extraction, but it cannot win hearts or build lasting order. Bringing true stability and prosperity to a region requires not aircraft carriers and bombs, but long-term planning and the resolve to see it through.

What China offers is precisely that possibility: cooperation over confrontation, construction over destruction, shared development over zero-sum competition. The road will hardly be smooth, but it at least points toward a future that resonates with people’s deepest aspirations. And on the other side of the ledger—America can sanction some people forever, and it can sanction everyone for a while, but it cannot sanction everyone forever.