The fight starts over Gaza’s next leaders
Ibrahim Al-Madhoun, The Cradle, January 24, 2025 ─
As Gaza emerges from war, Hamas – politically victorious at immense cost – faces unprecedented challenges in rebuilding the strip. Meanwhile, tenacious foreign powers maneuver to impose their own vision for Gaza’s governance.
Since the outbreak of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in October 2023, the occupation state’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas as the leading political and governing authority in the besieged enclave.
This US-backed aim reflects Israel’s long-standing unease with Hamas as both a political and military force, given the Palestinian resistance movement’s refusal to recognize the unpopular and practically obsolete Oslo Accords and its rejection of the legitimacy of the occupation.
Hamas’s rule in Gaza
Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip since its victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which led to the formation of the 10th Palestinian government under the late, martyred Ismail Haniyeh. However, the political rift between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 resulted in the exclusion of the Palestinian Authority (PA) from Gaza, leaving Hamas in full control of the territory.
Since assuming power, Hamas has endured multiple conflicts with Israel, notably in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021, culminating in the 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood – a move that has shaken West Asian and international dynamics, and brought the Palestine issue back to the forefront of the global agenda.
Israel’s strategic dilemma
As the conflict escalated, Israel sought to impose new realities in Gaza, employing several strategies, each of which faced considerable challenges. Initially, the occupation state aimed to invade Gaza and impose direct military rule.
This plan, however, was met with fierce Palestinian resistance, rendering it impossible to achieve sustained control of the strip. The financial and human toll of the war further complicated this approach, with Israel’s expenses estimated at 150 billion shekels (approximately $41.64 billion) and casualties amounting to at least 840 soldiers killed and 14,000 injured. This reality forced the occupation to rethink its strategy.
In an attempt to undermine Hamas’s governance, Israel deliberately targeted Gaza’s administrative and service infrastructures, including government institutions, municipalities, and public facilities.
The destruction was extensive, with a report from the UN Satellite Centre (UNOSAT) in late 2024 estimating that 66 percent of Gaza’s buildings had been damaged or destroyed. Despite this systematic devastation, Hamas demonstrated resilience, maintaining its control of Gaza with relative efficiency by relying on its extensive experience in crisis management.
Israel also tried to exploit Gaza’s tribal and familial networks, attempting to co-opt prominent families and clans to create localized administrative bodies.
This approach, too, was widely rejected by Gaza’s population, who viewed it as a thinly veiled effort to legitimize the occupation and fragment the national fabric. Prominent analysts, including Tahani Mustafa of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank, said Israel was “desperately looking for local clans and families on the ground to work with … they refuse.”
In parallel, Israel, the US, and allied Arab states have explored alternatives to Hamas’s rule, such as reinstating the PA or establishing an internationally supported technocratic government.
While the PA declared on 16 January its intention to “[form] a crisis cell to work in the Gaza Strip,” Hamas announced its preparations to immediately begin administering the city following the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The resistance movement stressed that it would not allow the ensuing “chaos and vacuum” in the strip to be exploited.
Meanwhile, the Israeli–American initiatives remain limited in their impact due to the complexities of the Palestinian internal situation, the weakness and unpopularity of the PA, and the mass rejection by Palestinians of a return to the pre-2007 order.
Challenges facing Hamas
Despite Israel’s failure to overthrow Hamas militarily – evidenced by the movement’s strong presence on the battlefield and in the media, particularly during the propagandized handover of three female prisoners in exchange for 90 Palestinian prisoners – the war has left Hamas grappling with significant challenges on multiple fronts.
The massive destruction inflicted on the Gaza Strip makes the rebuilding of critical infrastructure a top priority for Hamas. This reconstruction effort will require substantial international funding and support, raising concerns about potential external interference that could shape Gaza’s future governance.
Additionally, the ongoing Israeli blockade continues to exacerbate economic hardships in Gaza, placing relentless pressure on Hamas to devise solutions that can sustain the delivery of basic services to the enclave’s beleaguered population.
Hamas is also facing mounting pressure from regional and international actors to agree to political arrangements that could require extraordinary concessions. These might include accepting the oversight of an international administration or the deployment of Arab forces to manage a transitional phase in Gaza’s governance.
Possible scenarios for Gaza’s future
Several scenarios have been proposed regarding the future governance of the Gaza Strip, reflecting both internal dynamics and external influences:
Hamas remains confident in its ability to govern the strip despite the destruction and siege. The movement draws on widespread popular support in the region and its intact organizational infrastructure. It has also displayed a degree of flexibility in engaging with the PA and Egypt to explore potential compromises.
Yet efforts – led by Israel and supported by some regional actors – persist to reinstate the PA in Gaza. However, Mahmoud Abbas, Palestine’s president and head of Fatah, faces widespread criticism for his weak leadership and collaborative efforts in clamping down on resistance in the West Bank, making this scenario contingent on internal reforms or a change in PA leadership.
The possibility of a power-sharing arrangement between Hamas and the PA further complicates this option, as both sides hold entrenched positions on governance.
Alternatively, Egypt and other regional stakeholders have proposed the establishment of a technocratic committee comprising independent academic and community leaders to manage Gaza’s administration. While this idea has garnered some support from national and community bodies in the enclave, it has been rejected by the PA, which views it as a threat to its political dominance.
The Israeli Broadcasting Authority (KAN) reported that Egypt and Israel discussed the establishment of a security inspection mechanism in the Netzarim corridor, which connects the northern and southern parts of the strip.
Arab intervention
The US has also floated the idea of deploying an Arab security force, potentially involving Egypt and the UAE, to oversee Gaza’s transition. It is, at best, a proposal fraught with challenges.
Both Egypt and the UAE – strongly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas originates – are cautious about becoming deeply entangled in the Palestinian conflict.
They are particularly wary of the potential for Israel to exploit their involvement as a means to evade its obligations as an occupying power. Moreover, such a scenario risks alienating the Palestinian population and could provoke significant political and public backlash against the participating Arab states.
A potential, albeit challenging, solution involves the formation of a joint national committee comprising representatives from Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions. This scenario requires a level of political consensus that has been elusive thus far.
Furthermore, external actors, including the US and its allies, are likely to push for an arrangement that aligns with Israel’s strategic interests, complicating efforts to achieve a purely Palestinian-led solution.
In contrast, Hamas finds support from countries such as Iran, Qatar, and Turkiye, which strengthens its position in the face of international pressure.
Towards a comprehensive Palestinian consensus
The future of Gaza remains dependent on the extent to which the Palestinian parties are able to achieve an internal consensus that guarantees inclusive political representation of the Palestinian people. Hamas is showing political flexibility in the context of preserving its national and administrative gains, while the deeply unpopular PA is looking to restore the people’s confidence.
The best option for Palestinians is to move toward a comprehensive reconciliation that rebuilds the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and from which a new leadership emerges that adopts a unified national strategy.
The foundation for that vision was set by the Beijing Declaration last July, when 14 Palestinian political factions committed to the idea of national reconciliation under the auspices of China rather than partisan Arab states.
This scenario, despite its difficulty, remains the ideal solution to avoid external interference and ensure stable and independent management of Gaza in the post-war period.