Philippines Goes All In as U.S. Ally Against China
Dixiansiwei, The China Academy, July 29, 2025 —
In today’s multipolar world, even U.S. allies rarely manifest unwavering loyalty to Washington in public—except, it seems, Manila. The question is: is it worth it?
As of July 2025, it has been more than 13 years since the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff between China and the Philippines, and 11 years since the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Philippines.
In a flash, over a decade has passed—but the South China Sea (SCS) landscape has undergone a profound transformation, one unseen since the end of the Cold War.
The United States has intervened in the SCS disputes with unprecedented intensity—diplomatically, legally, and militarily—using the opportunity to rebuild a systemic military presence and reshape the region’s balance of power.
Meanwhile, the Philippines’ domestic political transitions have led to a rollercoaster foreign policy. These shifts have had outsized effects on Southeast Asia’s geopolitical dynamics, weakening ASEAN’s traditional leadership in regional security.
For over a decade, China and the international community have watched U.S. and Philippine policy signals closely, hoping for recalibration and a return to the “golden decade” of 2002–2012 in the SCS.
But such hopes, while well-intentioned, ignore the hard reality of power politics. U.S. policy on the South China Sea has stabilized, and the Philippines’ stance is unlikely to change substantially.
With President Marcos Jr.’s recent visit to the U.S. and his meeting with Trump, coupled with two large-scale U.S.-led air and naval drills in the western Pacific, the contours of geopolitical rivalry in the South China Sea are becoming more defined. The shadow of a “new Cold War” is looming.
Strategic Design: The U.S. Shapes a New SCS Order to Contain China
The current trajectory is one carefully crafted by the United States, aiming to sustain hegemonic returns at minimal cost. Winning the strategic competition with China is central to this design.
On July 20, Marcos Jr. visited the U.S., meeting first with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth before sitting down with Trump. Though billed as an “invited” visit, it was in essence a political pilgrimage.
While the public focus was on tariff disputes, in reality, the Philippines was willing to trade economic losses for U.S. security support. The U.S. was far less concerned with its modest bilateral trade deficit with the Philippines than with Manila’s continued role as a frontline proxy in containing China.
Superficially, U.S.-Philippine relations seem strained. Marcos Jr. has expressed concerns over the Trump administration’s unpredictability in the Indo-Pacific.
Economically, the Trump administration imposed a 17% reciprocal tariff on Philippine goods in April 2025, and on July 10 raised it to 20%.
In terms of security, the gap is widening between the U.S.’s broad aid retrenchment and the Marcos administration’s desire for enhanced military support to modernize its defense capabilities. Manila is clearly dissatisfied with mere verbal security assurances from U.S. officials—it seeks concrete, systemic commitments.
From Washington’s perspective, the Philippines is now labeled a trade-deficit country, and has been grouped with other Southeast Asian economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, all of which now face hefty reciprocal tariffs—some up to 40%. Still, the Philippines’ $5 billion trade surplus with the U.S. is negligible compared to Vietnam’s $123.5 billion or Thailand’s $35.4 billion.
In fact, the tariff friction is largely symbolic. The Philippines had already prepared to compromise. Prior to Marcos’s visit, his office stated it was ready to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement to build a strong, mutually beneficial partnership.
Top Philippine officials later emphasized that the new tariffs—while higher—remain the second-lowest in Southeast Asia (after Singapore), making the Philippines one of the most competitive U.S. trade partners in the region. While its ambassador to the U.S. floated hopes of reducing tariffs further, the Marcos government appeared largely indifferent, even seeing the 20% rate as a concession.
This indifference reflects a broader calculus: the economic cost is a price worth paying for security guarantees. Conversely, for the U.S., the Philippines’ strategic value far outweighs the minor trade imbalance. The Marcos and Trump administrations may show superficial divergence—but in essence, they are aligned.
An Independent U.S.-Philippine Axis Emerges in the Indo-Pacific
While U.S.-Philippine military ties are longstanding, the current deep integration—across military, security, diplomacy, politics, and economics—is unusual.
The Marcos-Trump summit signals the emergence of a U.S.-Philippine geopolitical “structure” within the Indo-Pacific. This new axis upends existing political and security frameworks, constructing an independent regional order.
The Philippines’ national security strategy has shifted:
Spatially: from island/land-based defense to maritime and air defense.
Doctrinally: from internal threats (e.g. separatism) to external ones—chiefly China in the SCS and Taiwan Strait.
Strategically: from autonomy to alliance-based defense, centered on the U.S.-Philippines alliance, supported by bilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia. This pivot includes asymmetric force-building via foreign assistance.
Few U.S. allies have gone as all-in as the Philippines. Manila has now fully embraced its identity as a U.S. ally, shedding its former ASEAN-centered economic identity. It sees favorable tariff treatment not as a regional issue but a national advantage over ASEAN peers.
U.S. Strategic Entrenchment in the South China Sea
Despite changes in U.S. administrations, its SCS strategy has grown more stable and complete.
Recent odd signals—such as the State Department cutting senior SCS positions or Trump’s remark that he “doesn’t mind if the Philippines gets along with China”—do not indicate disengagement. Rather, they reflect strategic confidence: the U.S. has already secured its military foothold in the Philippines and established its regional position.
Three core features define the new U.S. architecture in the SCS:
A.Geostrategic Depth via Military Bases in the Philippines
The U.S. now operates two strategic “concentric circles”:
The first spans the Philippine archipelago, covering the entire South China Sea and extending toward the Xisha and Nansha Islands. U.S. reconnaissance drones, aircraft, and naval systems can rapidly operate from eight key bases. Typhon missile systems now place China within the U.S. deterrence perimeter inside the First Island Chain.
The second extends outward, linking the SCS with Taiwan and the South Pacific. Among the four new bases granted under EDCA, three are located in northern Luzon, directly facing the Taiwan Strait. These enable preparations for amphibious, aerial, and maritime operations in case of a Taiwan contingency.
The Philippines now connects the U.S. Guam–Australia base chain and forms part of two “firewalls” protecting U.S. homeland security.
B.Straits Control and Chokepoint Dominance
Through cooperation with Philippine forces, the U.S. now seeks control over vital maritime chokepoints: the Bashi, Balintang, Babuyan, Mindoro, Balabac, and Sibutu Straits.
Blocking China’s maritime trade routes is a long-standing U.S. strategy, dating back to 2014 when defense analysts like T.X. Hammes proposed “offshore control”—avoiding direct strikes on China but severing its sea lines to induce economic pain.
U.S. defense agencies and congressional bills have since studied the feasibility of this, including a 2025 announcement from the Federal Maritime Commission reviewing seven major global sea lanes—clearly aimed at China.
C.Quad-plus-One Island Chain Security Structure
Given the Philippines’ lack of military or economic strength to match its geographic importance, the U.S. has launched a “targeted aid” strategy under a “U.S.–Japan–Australia–Philippines” framework.
Japan, for instance, now provides more military aid to the Philippines than the U.S., supplying coastal radars and six secondhand Abukuma-class frigates under its OSA program. This approach helps the U.S. cheaply build up Manila’s asymmetric capabilities and positions the Philippines as a “gatekeeper” along the First Island Chain.
The “New Cold War”: U.S. Indo-Pacific Grand Strategy Takes Shape
Coinciding with Marcos’s visit, the U.S. launched two massive military exercises in the western Pacific:
The Return of Forces to the Western Pacific (REFORPAC) (July 10) involved 300+ aircraft and 12,000 personnel across more than 50 locations from Alaska to northern Australia.
Exercise “Talisman Sabre” in the Indo-Pacific drew 19 participating countries, featuring Typhon missile launches, HIMARS artillery, AI and cyber warfare exercises, and joint amphibious operations.
These drills, coupled with the Marcos-Trump summit, signal a maturing U.S. grand strategy: building a “New Cold War” order.
If the summit marks the formation of a stable anti-China front line, the exercises represent battlefield rehearsals and attempts to send China a message of “credible deterrence.”