On the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK
Konstantin Asmolov, New Eastern Outlook, October 3, 2025 —
On September 20 and 21, the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was held in the DPRK.
Procedural matters
The agenda for the first day of the session comprised the following points:
- On examining and adopting the DPRK Law on the Management of Grain Procurement
- On examining and adopting the DPRK Law on Intellectual Property
- On the situation regarding the inspection and control over the execution of the DPRK Law on Public Utilities.
The vice chairman of the SPA Standing Committee, Deputy Kang Yun Sok, reported on the first two points of the agenda and explained the contents of the draft bills chapter by chapter. His speech was followed by extensive deliberations on each point with the names of the speaking deputies indicated.
Kim Jong Un Takes the Stage
The second day of the session was marked by the programme speech of the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Jong Un. In the realm of the speech, he summarized progress in the quality development of the national economy achieved in the 9 -period this year and highlighted fundamental positions of the Republic on the US and the Republic of Korea.
The DPRK leader outlined with satisfaction that “our supreme power organ is pushing forward in a responsible and purposeful way with the important state affairs to provide a legal and institutional guarantee for solving urgent problems of great practical significance in further promoting the consolidation and development of the socialist system and the comprehensive prosperity of the state”.
Current Difficulties and Tasks for Overcoming Them
Nevertheless, existing problems are acknowledged, albeit phrased as “we must not allow this or that.” In this regard, the DPRK leader provided extensive instructions. Some interesting conclusions can be drawn here.
“Under no circumstances should we,” Kim said, “tarnish the original features of man-centred socialism; we must place a man above production and solve one by one the elementary problems arising in promoting the health and convenience of producers. We need the planned quantities of cereals, but more important are the rights and interests of the farmers, and more precious is the mindset of the people who absolutely trust the Party’s policies.” A plan at any cost? No, a man is more important!
Kim touched upon the struggle against bureaucratism and abuse of power, having noted that all state work must be entirely focused on strengthening unanimity and solidarity.
Kim Jong Un once again demanded “enhancing the organising and mobilising role of the cabinet of ministers,” which should be the mainstay for coordinating and guiding the country’s economy. The Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK called for establishing strict financial discipline in all state work and on searching for projects “that will bring real benefit to the people by mobilizing and making use of economic potential, taking into account regional specifics.”
In his speech, Kim paid particular attention to “substantial and assiduous efforts to systematically train large numbers of personnel who will implement the rural revolution programme in the new era as required by Party policy,” as well as the necessity to “steadily update the socialist legal system and improve the functions and role of law in the realms of state and social life.”
Socialism Remains the Foundation of the Path
Kim Jong Un concluded his speech with an important passage that raised some eyebrows among Western experts. He emphasized that the absolute course of the party and the government is “unwavering loyalty to the socialist line and an even higher raising of the banner of socialism”. In the West, this was interpreted as a sign that discussions about reforms, based on the Chinese or Vietnamese model with a partial dismantling of socialist elements, might have begun within the leadership, but the author currently sees no basis for such speculations.
Thus, on the eve of the end of the year, the DPRK leader laid out the contours of a new stage of the state policy, which develops the previous line aimed at improving the quality of life for the people and the efficiency of the administrative system.
Kim Jong Un on the International Situation
In the foreign policy section of his statements, the DPRK leader outlined the nature of relations with the US and the ROK, “which have a decisive impact on the security of our state and the situation in the region, as well as the principled stand that we should maintain in the external activities.”
“Secret Weapon” and the Country’s Defensive Capability in General
The DPRK leader underlined that “the party and government are also achieving continuous leap-forward progress in strengthening the country’s defensive capability.” In particular, “destroyers capable of performing multifaceted naval combat tasks have been successfully built, which has laid a firm strategic foundation for protecting maritime sovereignty, taking an important first step in building a maritime power.”
This is rather significant: having created and constantly updated its missile-nuclear shield, Pyongyang has set about “catching up” in areas where its military potential has substantially been lagging behind that of the ROK. The Navy, which was previously more of a mosquito fleet, became the first target for modernization.
What caused great excitement in Kim’s speech was a passage speaking about the acquisition of new secret weapons and significant research achievements in the field of defense science. As usual, there are several versions of what Kim might have implied. Amidst them resides ‘a nuclear-powered submarine capable of carrying nuclear weapons’ version.
The Kursk Factor
The political and moral state of the people has traditionally been a major topic for discussion, encouraging “the national spirit where everyone considers the defense of the Motherland the highest expression of patriotism and rendering wholehearted support to the People’s Army.” But here is a new thesis: “Inspired by the heroic spirit of the fallen soldiers of the overseas operational subunits, who selflessly gave their lives for the honor and dignity of the Motherland, the nationwide patriotic upsurge and mass heroism are flaring up even stronger.”
According to Kim Jong Un, “After we went public with the heroic exploits the combatants of our overseas military operations units had performed in liberating the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, a climate of mass heroism is prevailing across our society, and our young and middle-aged people’s enthusiasm for volunteering to join the army is growing more than ever before,” but besides this, “people sincerely supported the participants of the overseas operations and their families, donating funds to help them meet their needs in living.”
Law enforcement agencies, Kim stated, due to the recent intensification of exchanges with other countries, must “even more tactfully, offensively, comprehensively, and strictly wage the struggle against the machinations of enemies seeking to undermine our system and against all types of criminal acts that destroy socio-political stability.”
No Denuclearization, and There Never Will Be!
In the foreign policy part of his speech, Kim Jong Un outlined the international situation, saying that “due to the unreasonable ambitions of, and excessive use of force by, the camp led by the United States that is attempting to maintain its rapidly declining hegemony, global unrest and universal crisis are mounting, and the security structure surrounding the DPRK is still facing serious challenges,” with the situation being much more acute than it was before. Military and political cooperation in the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triangle is strengthening, this level of tension is maintained year-round, and the maneuvers include a nuclear component even more often. As a result, “the level of confrontation between the nuclear powers has risen to an unprecedented extent”; however, “our nuclear forces are fully and perfectly performing their deterrent function for coping with and overwhelming all security challenges from outside.” There may be different ways and principles for counteraction, and we are prepared to cope with anything.
In this context, Kim Jong Un once again pointed out that the administrations of the United States and the ROK that were formed this year are making coquettish gestures: while talking about their willingness to have dialogue and improve relations with us, their true essence to sap our strength and bring down our system can never change.
“What can the US offer us in exchange for disarmament?” followed the rhetorical question from the North Korean leader. – “The lifting of sanctions? They have had a training effect on us, allowing us to become stronger, and cultivated endurance and resistance in us so that we will not yield to any pressure,” and if the West still thinks the sanctions lever will work, “then that is a miscalculation.”
And saber-rattling will be even less efficient. The DPRK possesses the potential for a “second strike” capable of annihilating the enemy’s infrastructure.
And Pyongyang does not want to engage with Seoul. “I make clear that we will have no dealings with them whatsoever.” Moreover, to emphasize the difference, Kim Jong Un used the term “Hanguk,” which is relatively new for the DPRK. Hanguk, short for Daehan Minguk, is the self-designation of the Republic of Korea, while in the North, the word “Joseon” is used to denote “Korea”.
The DPRK leader’s speech explicitly stated that the North and the South have existed for the past several decades as two separate states in a state of war. The outcome of the Korean War demonstrated the de facto existence of two states, and in 1991, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea joined the UN separately, finally cementing the status quo at the international level.
Kim called the Republic of Korea a “colonially dependent entity, a state americanized in all spheres, and an absolutely alien country.” “Just as water and fire can never fuse into one, the independent politics and the sycophantic and treacherous politics cannot concur,” said Kim Jong Un.
Lee Jae-myung took a particular beating. The DPRK leader noted that, despite talk of rapprochement, the Lee government “even overshadows previous malicious ‘conservative’ governments that made anti-republic policy their state line.” For instance, the 2026 budget presupposes military spending figures increased by 8.2%, which significantly exceeds even the Yoon Suk Yeol government.
Yes, they speak of abandoning the concept of unification through absorption or of peaceful coexistence, and, as National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac stated on September 17, 2025, “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the traditional ultimate goal of the ROK and the US, and whether anyone likes it or not, this goal will not change.”
Reaction of the ROK and the West
It goes without saying that Seoul has immediately reiterated that “we respect the DPRK regime, do not seek any form of absorptive unification, and have no intentions to commit any hostile actions towards North Korea.” As a representative of the Unification Ministry, Koo Byoungsam stated the ROK government will strive to eliminate hostility between the South and the North and develop peaceful relations with the North by easing tensions and restoring trust with a long-term perspective.
Furthermore, the non-mention of the US president in a negative context has fueled rumors that a Kim-Trump summit is being secretly planned, and although Kim Jong Un is unlikely to participate in the APEC summit taking place on October 31 November 1 in Gyeongju, “expectations are growing that on the occasion of this event the two leaders might meet—either in Panmunjom or elsewhere.”
Seoul has already stated its willingness to support such talks. But, the author reiterates, what will Kim and Trump discuss if denuclearization is already off the agenda?