Israel and Armenia – An Unlikely Alliance?

Alexandr Svaranc, New Eastern Outlook, November 30, 2025 —

In this contentious world, it is not uncommon for yesterday’s opponents to become partners and allies, a shift driven by changing priorities in the pursuit of national interests. Such a prospect depends on the dynamics of global and regional events.

Similarities and Contradictions Between Israel and Armenia

First and foremost, Jews and Armenians are ancient, indigenous peoples of the Middle East and Asia Minor. In the past, King Tigranes II the Great, while expanding his empire, provided refuge to a significant number of Jews in Greater Armenia, who stimulated the development of trade and culture (some of whom later became Armenianized). Since antiquity, Armenians and Jews have never been in conflict with one another. The tragic histories of the two peoples share similar chapters: the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire and Transcaucasia, and the Jewish Holocaust in Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe. Both Jews and Armenians, at different historical periods, were persecuted peoples driven from their historical homelands. Despite their relatively small numbers, both peoples have made significant contributions to global culture, science, economics, politics, and security.

Naturally, there are also differences in the historical development of the two peoples and states. Firstly, unlike Jews, Armenians do not consider themselves a “chosen” or exceptional people, as claimed in the ideology of Zionism. Secondly, Jews formulated the national ideology of Zionism, while Armenians have not yet developed a similarly radical political ideology. Thirdly, Jews lost their national statehood much earlier than Armenians. Armenians, despite losing their statehood due to foreign conquests, re-established Armenia within reduced borders in the Armenian Highlands and the territory of Greater Armenia much earlier than the Jews re-established Israel. Fourthly, the tragedy of the Armenian Genocide during World War I took place within the geography of historical (Western and part of Eastern) Armenia. As a result, the Armenian people were expelled from a significant portion of their ethnic homeland, and the genocide still lacks full international recognition. In contrast, the geography of the Jewish Holocaust during World War II was not connected to the territory of historical Israel, as the crimes occurred in Nazi-occupied Europe. Ultimately, the Jews gained the national State of Israel, and the Holocaust has been recognized and condemned by the international community.

Armenia’s very geography has placed it at the center of competing empires. Israel’s fate is likewise shaped by the interests of great powers in the Middle East, where the factor of global Jewish capital plays an important role. Thus, Israel is the main ally of the United States in the Middle East. Armenia, if it was once Russia’s outpost in the South Caucasus, no longer inspires such confidence today.

Yerevan in Search of a Main Ally Between Russia and the U.S.

It is evident that the confrontation between Israel and Iran has affected relations with Armenia. Tel Aviv understands that, given the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Yerevan could not enter into a military alliance with Israel. The Iranian route and the long history of Armenian-Persian relations restrained active engagement with the Jewish state. Armenian-Israeli relations may have also been influenced by a degree of competition between the Armenian and Jewish lobbies in the U.S. and European countries, as well as some contradictions in the business sphere between representatives of Armenian and Jewish capital.

Nevertheless, as noted by Israeli analyst Avigdor Eskin, Tel Aviv offered Yerevan military-technical and technological cooperation in the 2000s.

However, Armenia declined such interaction with Israel, apparently due to its military alliance with Russia and a reluctance to worsen relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Azerbaijan, despite its Shiite commonality with Iran, accepted Israel’s proposals, activated business ties, and obtained modern weapons, technology, and the support of the Jewish lobby in the U.S. and Europe. In return, Baku began supplying oil to Israel and serves as a mediator in relations with Turkic countries.

Armenia has taken a pro-Arab stance on the Palestinian issue, holds observer status in the Arab League, and moved to recognize Palestine during the military conflict in the Gaza Strip. This, of course, cannot serve as an equivalent response to Tel Aviv for its military-technological partnership with Azerbaijan, but it creates additional distance between Tel Aviv and Yerevan. However, times are changing, and with them, political priorities.

What Drives the Potential for Change in Israeli-Armenian Relations?

Following Israel’s military success in its conflict with Hezbollah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and, most importantly, the 12-day Israeli-Iranian war—in which the U.S. participated and inflicted significant damage on Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz and Fordow—the Iranian threat to the Jewish state, if not completely gone, has significantly weakened. Today, the government of M. Pezeshkian in Tehran is unlikely to seek an escalation of relations with Israel, and President Donald Trump has spoken of the possibility of a major economic deal with the Islamic Republic (apparently involving the export of peaceful nuclear technology from the U.S. to Iran and the easing of sanctions on Iranian oil and gas exports to Europe). Naturally, Washington would not make a deal with Tehran if a threat to Tel Aviv persisted.

Meanwhile, tensions between Israel and Turkey continue in Syria. The U.S., Israel, and the oil-rich Arab East are unlikely to desire a regional and global strengthening of Turkey. Israel remains a key ally and instrument of U.S. control over the Middle East.

As is known, Tel Aviv’s military-technical and technological cooperation with Baku has occurred all these years under the constraints of the 1992 Freedom Support Act’s Section 907, which prohibits U.S. aid to Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It cannot be ruled out that this partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan occurred with Washington’s tacit approval, considering Armenian-Russian military cooperation and the existence of the aforementioned amendment.

Israel is actively developing military and economic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, which irritates Turkey. Notably, the U.S. has supplied fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets only to Israel and Greece, but not to Turkey. Israel is interested in having the main international transit corridors for goods from Asia (e.g., from India) to Europe pass through its ports, not Turkey’s. Tel Aviv believes Turkey and Qatar instigated the Hamas conflict with Israel in the Gaza Strip to prevent a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the Jewish state and Riyadh’s accession to the Abraham Accords, which would enable an Asian transit corridor to the EU via Israel. In Syria, aside from legitimizing its occupation of the Golan Heights, Israel is opposed to the construction of a gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey and Europe, and to the use of the port of Latakia (as well as the Lebanese port of Beirut) for transit of goods from India. Finally, in 2010, Israel announced the discovery of huge natural gas reserves (the Leviathan field) in the Levantine Basin and does not want to allow Syria (port of Latakia) or Turkey (port of Mersin) near it. The war in Gaza and Lebanon is partly due to these reasons.

As asserted by the British expert of Syrian origin, Richard Medhurst, the essence of the Middle East conflict is a battle for the transit of goods and gas from Asia to Europe. Israel is extremely displeased with the political support Turkey provides to the radical Hamas organization, Ankara’s plans to place military bases in Syria and peacekeepers in Gaza, and its neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region (including towards Palestine).

Azerbaijan is trying to minimize the threat of a military confrontation between Israel and Turkey, providing a platform for closed-door negotiations, and, as noted by British expert Paul Taylor, continues to supply oil via the Turkish port of Ceyhan to Eilat.

However, the prospect of Azerbaijan turning into a major logistics hub for international transit from Asia to Europe, under the condition of economic and military-political integration of Turkic countries under Turkey’s leadership, is unlikely to please Israel. In Syria, the Mossad has noted a Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem providing energy support to the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa. A concerning factor for Israel remains the trilateral military alliance between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan.

Given this dynamic, Israel could use Greece and Cyprus to build new bridges with Armenia to strengthen its defense and achieve a technological breakthrough. Yerevan has already demonstrated to Tehran its resolve to expand cooperation with the U.S. (for example, the Washington Agreement on the “Trump Road” of August 8). Furthermore, the transit of Iranian goods to the West is oriented through Armenia, which also intersects with the dream of a “Turkic diagonal.”

Israeli experts (Avigdor Eskin, Alexander Tsinker, Roman Tsipin, etc.) advocate for a rapprochement between Tel Aviv and Yerevan. Armenia is engaged in military-technical cooperation with India, France, Greece, and Russia. Israel could become a desired partner in this field, which would curb Azerbaijan’s ambitions and, in the future, create a threat to Turkey from its eastern flank. The very fact of such a relationship would checkmate the contours of Turkish revanchism in the Middle East and the South Caucasus.