After mid-July, the laden Iranian tankers still visible to commercial trackers all but disappeared from the Strait of Hormuz. Some vessels may have continued moving with their transponders switched off. Even so, the recorded traffic showed how quickly Iran’s main oil outlet had again become the narrowest point in its economy.
The strait remains the decisive vulnerability. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade moved through it before the US–Israeli war on Iran began in late February. Traffic collapsed, partially recovered under the June memorandum, and then fell again.
Iranian officials have repeatedly tied any sustained reopening to broader political conditions. The recurring uncertainty has forced Tehran to adapt its economic geography around the chokepoint.
Oil under pressure
Available data show the scale of the disruption. Pre-war Iranian crude exports averaged around 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd), with China taking more than 80 percent. Data from ship-tracking company Kpler indicates that Chinese imports of Iranian crude fell to roughly 534,000 bpd in the first part of August, far below the 1.4 million bpd average of 2025. Offers to Chinese buyers declined, and prices rose as the US blockade tightened.
At the same time, Iranian authorities reported transferring $7.5 billion in oil-related foreign-currency proceeds to the central bank during the first four months of the current Iranian calendar year, from late March to late July 2026. The figure shows that revenue was still reaching the state, although it included proceeds from oil sold earlier.
What revenue remains is moving under more constrained conditions. Longer routes, ship-to-ship transfers, opaque intermediaries, and vessels that frequently switch off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) have raised costs. Chinese buyers have drawn on cargo already outside the Gulf and floating stocks in Asian waters. The net effect is lower volumes and higher friction around the same barrels.
Iran’s response has been to strengthen secondary routes and settlement channels that reduce, without eliminating, dependence on the strait. These cannot replace Hormuz as an outlet for crude on anything like the same scale. They can keep imports moving, expand non-oil trade, and prevent pressure on one maritime route from sealing the country off altogether.
Routes beyond the Gulf
Trade and logistics with Russia and China have expanded along the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and related overland and Caspian links. Cargo volumes on the corridor grew 12 percent in 2025 to 3.5 million tonnes, while Russian exports toward Iran rose by more than 56 percent in the first four months of 2026, albeit from a limited base.
The Astara freight terminal is nearing completion, with Azerbaijan Railways reporting that design work is almost finished and construction more than 93 percent complete. The missing Rasht–Astara rail segment remains unfinished.
Land acquisition has advanced, and Russian financing remains in place – but until the line is built, cargo must still change between rail and road. Caspian shipping between Russian and Iranian ports has therefore taken on greater practical importance. It avoids the Gulf blockade, even if it remains exposed to sanctions, surveillance, and limited port capacity.
Kazakhstan has also secured a long-term logistics footprint at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas and has expressed interest in Chabahar. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran rose sharply in 2025. The Bandar Abbas terminal strengthens regional trade but does not bypass Hormuz. Chabahar, on the Gulf of Oman, is the more relevant outlet for that purpose.