Iran’s approach to the Black Sea, prospects

Samyar Rostami, New Eastern Outlook, May 8, 2025 — 

It seems that Iran’s connection and Tehran’s focus on the Black Sea region will be a higher priority than in previous years. However, there is still a long way to go before the Black Sea becomes Iran’s top geopolitical and geostrategic priority.

Iran’s foreign policy in the past few decades has sought to establish initial, minimal, and close diplomatic ties with the countries of the Black Sea region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tehran’s relations with Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria were formed or developed through bilateral or multilateral relations.

Deeper ties with Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria have been less frequent in the past decade.

Apart from Tehran’s good relations with Turkey, in recent years, Tehran has praised Russia as a strategic partner. However, relations with Ukraine have significantly declined in the past three years due to the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

However, it seems that the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Black Sea region for Iran has increased, and the Black Sea’s position in Iran’s foreign policy is increasing. A kind of increasing position of Eurasia-Asia in Iran’s foreign policy has become more evident.

The Black Sea is a strategic crossroads for Europe, Asia, and the Middle East for many reasons. Given the increasing geopolitical and strategic importance of the South Caucasus for Iran, Tehran has also been strengthening its position in the Black Sea in recent years.

Russia is the main player in the Black Sea, and Iran’s view of the Black Sea is also influenced by the “Look East” discourse and strategic relations with Russia and China.

From Tehran’s point of view, the new order of the multipolar world is being formed in the framework of a series of coalitions in the multipolar world.

It seems that Iran also considers the model of multilateral cooperation between Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing to reduce Washington’s geopolitical presence in the region.

It also strongly opposes the expansion of NATO’s borders to the east, which it considers a direct threat to national security. Some countries in the region are interested in joining NATO. If the Black Sea littoral countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, join NATO, it would be undesirable for Iran.

Therefore, Tehran seems to consider a greater presence in the region as a solution to counter Western dominance in the region and to coordinate and support Russia.

In another dimension, the absence of widespread ideological-political and historical conflicts is an important opportunity for the growth of Tehran’s relations with the Black Sea countries in the political and diplomatic spheres. Also, despite the challenges, relations with actors such as Romania and Bulgaria have been maintained. In 2024, Bulgarian officials met with Iranian counterparts.

Iran has tried to increase political and diplomatic relations with the Black Sea region by planning to play a mediating role in regional crises, support and assist other countries in the region in becoming members of international and regional organizations, develop security cooperation with regional countries in the fields of combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, and emphasize national interests and territorial integrity.

Economy and geoeconomics

Deepening economic relations, strengthening trade relations, promoting joint investments, lifting sanctions, improving foreign relations, signing economic and trade agreements, increasing exports and imports, and accessing new technologies are among Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s priorities.

In recent years, meetings and cooperation between Iran and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) have become more prominent to realize national development programs in increasing trade volume, transportation, food security and food supply chain, climate, and disaster management.

Maximizing the use of Iran’s transport potential and the importance and prospects of joint logistics, transport, and regional energy projects with the Black Sea are important for Tehran.

With increasing sanctions and pressure from the West, along with efforts to isolate Russia and Iran globally, the national interests of Moscow and Tehran have become closer, and expanding trade and economic cooperation through the Black Sea has become more prominent. The two countries are cooperating on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Volga-Don Canal. In fact, further connecting the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea will increase trade opportunities for Iran. The INSTC also increases economic ties with the Black Sea region.

In recent years, the creation of the “Persian Gulf-Black Sea” international multipurpose transport corridor (connecting Iran to Europe via Georgia, Georgia, and the Black Sea) has been on the agenda of Iran. In addition, considering the neighborhood of Iran and Turkey and the proximity of the Black Sea port of Trabzon to the northwest of Iran (580 km), equipping the Tabriz-Trabzon corridor can provide new capacities for transit and trade with the region.

In another dimension, the Black Sea is a source of food and grain for Iran. Iran also has huge hydrocarbon resources and can still become one of the suppliers of gas to Europe (energy diplomacy) via the Black Sea.

Challenges and prospects

The West-centric approach of some Black Sea countries and strategic partnership with the United States, ongoing Washington-Tehran tensions, multidimensional tensions between Iran and Israel, regional instability and geopolitical conflicts in the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus, and geopolitical competition between major powers, prevent further development of relations between Iran and the Black Sea region. Iran also does not yet have a comprehensive and specific strategy for the Black Sea.

Previously, Iran had made the Middle East a priority of its foreign policy, and the Black Sea was of little importance. However, the multidimensional importance of the Black Sea in Iran’s foreign policy is increasing.

The future of Tehran’s foreign policy towards the Black Sea will be influenced by political and diplomatic factors, economic interdependence, the development of regional policies, and the nature of regional crises.

If Iran succeeds in diplomatically resolving its differences with the West, especially with Europe, Iran’s focus will increase on improving relations with Western-oriented actors in the Black Sea; but if tensions with Washington and Brussels continue, Iran’s relations will only expand with Russia and Turkey, and possibly Georgia.

It seems that Iran’s connection and Tehran’s focus on the Black Sea region will be a higher priority than in previous years. However, there is still a long way to go before the Black Sea becomes Iran’s top geopolitical and geostrategic priority.