India Ready to Pay the Price for Closer Ties with Beijing

Guancha.cn, The China Academy, August 7, 2025 —

After years of friction, Modi’s upcoming visit to China signals a thaw in India-China relations against the backdrop of recent U.S. tariff hikes. As New Delhi plays both sides, it’s clear that India is prepared to pay a heavy price to maintain its strategic autonomy.

Indian Prime Minister Modi is reportedly expected to visit China at the end of this month to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin. If the visit takes place, it would mark Modi’s first trip to China in seven years. As India’s economic and trade relations with the United States fall into a slump, its recalibration of ties with China is seen as a potentially key move to counterbalance the U.S.

Though neither China nor India has officially announced Modi’s visit, Indian government sources say preparations are underway for his trip. Modi’s attendance at the SCO Tianjin Summit also opens the door to a potential meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders. Possible discussion topics at such a meeting may include advancing the normalization of bilateral relations, easing tensions along the border, resuming direct flights, reopening border trade posts, and strengthening people-to-people exchanges.

Modi’s visit comes as U.S. President Donald Trump criticizes BRICS countries for continuing to import oil from Russia and accuses the bloc of challenging the U.S. dollar’s dominance. As a BRICS member, India has also become embroiled in a tariff dispute with the United States. On August 6 (local time), Trump signed an executive order imposing an additional 25% tariff on India, citing its “direct or indirect” purchase of Russian energy. As a result, the overall U.S. tariff rate on Indian goods has now reached 50%.

As a result, foreign media have widely linked Modi’s upcoming visit to China with the recent downturn in U.S.-India relations.

In response, Lin Minwang, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, said that Modi’s visit sends a generally positive signal for the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the improvement of China-India relations. However, he noted that tying the visit to U.S.-India tensions isn’t entirely accurate, as the itinerary had been set well in advance and was not a sudden response to Trump’s announcement of additional tariffs on India.

In recent months, China and India have seen frequent high-level engagement in the areas of defense, security, and diplomacy, with clear signs of a warming trend in bilateral ties. In July, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited China to attend the SCO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting—his first trip to China since 2020. In June, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh also made successive visits to China.

According to Lin Minwang, the Indian government has, in fact, laid considerable groundwork for Modi’s visit.

The signs of warming relations go beyond diplomatic visits. India’s government think tank, NITI Aayog, recently proposed easing the additional scrutiny imposed on Chinese investment. Meanwhile, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has stated that the two countries have reached a consensus to accelerate the resumption of direct flights.

What deserves vigilance is that India, aiming to strengthen its bargaining chips against the U.S., is “phasedly” improving relations with China to signal to Washington that India “is not geopolitically cornered and still retains options.”

In 2020, China and India had a border standoff, after which their relations deteriorated. In October 2024, the two countries reached an agreement on border patrols, and exchanges began to warm again.

Lin Minwang pointed out that since last year, Modi has quietly started to adjust India’s “one-sided” policy toward the U.S. However, how far he can go in improving relations with China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia remains to be seen.

For example, India, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, has also joined the Quad Security Dialogue. Modi told Nikkei Asia that India has never intended to bind itself to any single security alliance. “For India, participation in both organizations is neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive.” Modi also said, “As a member of the ‘Global South,’ our interest in any multilateral environment is to serve as a bridge between different voices and contribute to a constructive and positive agenda.”

Moreover, India often plays an “alternative” role within the SCO. At the SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in Qingdao this June, Indian Defense Minister Singh refused to sign the joint statement and accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism while promoting India’s victories. As a leader, Modi has also frequently skipped key meetings, such as the 2024 Astana Summit, even pushing to make English a working language—challenging the operational norms advocated by China and Russia.

Now, New Delhi’s relationship with Washington is undergoing significant adjustments, with notable differences between the two on many issues including trade, diplomacy, Russian energy deals, and arms purchases.

Lin Minwang pointed out that at this stage, India is essentially practicing a form of “playing both sides” diplomacy—improving relations with China and participating more actively in SCO activities—to gain leverage in resolving its conflicts with the U.S. and the West.

However, under the Trump 2.0 era, public opinion generally believes that India’s “playing both sides” diplomatic approach is coming to an end, and its diplomatic isolation will become increasingly apparent.

Just after the U.S. decided to impose an additional 50% tariff on India, Prime Minister Modi stated on August 7 that India will never compromise. Modi also said he is aware of the cost of taking this stance.

“I know we will pay a heavy price for this, and I am prepared. India is ready.”