India as the SCO’s Troubled Guest

Guancha.cn, The China Academy, July 15, 2025 —

When India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017, it was seen as a bold move into Eurasian geopolitics. But India has since acted as a reluctant guest.

This year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit will be held in Tianjin, China. At the SCO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Qingdao, which just concluded in June, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh refused to sign the joint statement and accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism while boasting of India’s victories—once again playing the role of the “maverick” within the SCO.

Between May 7 and 10 this year, a major military clash erupted between India and Pakistan following an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. Because both India and Pakistan are members, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) faced a severe test during this crisis. The conflict not only challenged the SCO’s crisis management capabilities but also exposed structural flaws within the organization caused by member-state rivalries.

The tension was further exacerbated in June by Israel and the United States’ military strikes against Iran. The SCO strongly condemned Israel’s actions in its joint statement, calling the operation a “violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.” India, also an SCO member, refused to join the statement and almost simultaneously issued its own separate declaration, stating that it didn’t participate in the organization’s decision on this matter.

For many international observers, India has become an internal liability to the healthy development of the SCO. This view echoes that of Paulo Batista, former vice president of the New Development Bank of the BRICS and Brazilian economist, who sees India under Modi’s leadership increasingly as a problem within the BRICS grouping.

In other words, how India’s role is handled will be crucial to the SCO’s future and fate.

First, India’s stance toward China and Pakistan has increasingly exposed the SCO’s inefficiencies in internal coordination.

India and Pakistan’s accession in 2017 marked the SCO’s first expansion into South Asia, significantly boosting the organization’s population and economic scale but also introducing complex internal contradictions.

As a regional power in South Asia, India’s entry was motivated both by Russia’s desire to balance China’s influence and India’s own intent to expand its geopolitical reach in Central Asia. Yet India’s participation has always been fraught with contradictions: on one hand, it seeks to strengthen ties with Central Asia and Russia through the SCO; on the other, its border disputes with China, opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and longstanding conflict with Pakistan have become obstacles to internal coordination within the SCO.

The SCO’s decision-making depends on consensus. Since India’s entry, the cyclical flare-ups of Indo-Pak conflicts and Sino-Indian tensions have repeatedly stalled security and economic agendas, often resulting in deadlock and making the organization’s coordination inefficiencies increasingly evident.

Second, India’s obstructive and disruptive role in the SCO has become more pronounced in recent years.

Since the 2017 Doklam standoff, India has viewed the SCO and the BRICS mechanism more as tools to hedge against and contain China’s influence than as platforms for deepening cooperation.

Economically, the Belt and Road Initiative has become a public good for Eurasian developing countries including SCO members. After India joined, it has opposed any SCO cooperative documents mentioning the BRI, “community of shared future for mankind,” and other China-promoted cooperation concepts, instead pushing other members to back its own connectivity and trade cooperation agenda.

Politically, India has turned the SCO into a stage to cater to its domestic nationalist sentiments. Particularly after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, India banned Chinese apps and restricted Chinese investment, policies which extended into the SCO framework and stalled cooperation. This antagonism peaked at the 2024 SCO summit, where India was the sole member refusing to endorse the BRI in the joint communiqué, triggering collective isolation by the other nine members.

On security matters, India relies on Western alliances, actively participating in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. It has strengthened military cooperation and defense high-tech agreements with the United States. At the same time, India has been passive in SCO military cooperation, obstructing agendas led by China and Russia, refusing to participate in the 2021 Pakistan-hosted joint counterterrorism exercises, thereby undermining the integrity of SCO counterterrorism efforts and asserting its so-called “strategic autonomy.”

Additionally, Indian leaders have repeatedly skipped key meetings—such as the 2024 Astana summit—and have even demanded that English be recognized as a working language, challenging the operational norms advocated by China and Russia.

Following the recent India-Pakistan conflict, India initially remained silent about the heavy losses it suffered after launching military strikes against Pakistan without any evidence. Instead, it aggressively promoted its “resounding victory” in the operations. Now, two months later, India has gradually acknowledged that several of its advanced aircraft were shot down by Pakistan, but Indian Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Rahul Singh claimed India was fighting against three adversaries at the time. From any perspective, the India-Pakistan clash has dealt a serious blow to the SCO:

The SCO faces the risk of its security cooperation framework collapsing.

First, the counterterrorism agenda has been set back. One of the SCO’s core functions is joint efforts to combat the “three forces” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Currently, India accuses Pakistan of supporting Kashmiri militants, which Pakistan denies; Pakistan in turn accuses India of supporting Baloch separatist terrorist groups and the Pakistani Taliban, providing evidence to the international community. Both India and Pakistan refuse to share intelligence within SCO’s regional counterterrorism agencies.

Second, military trust among member states has declined: although a ceasefire has been reached, Indian Prime Minister Modi called it a “temporary ceasefire,” and military exchanges between India and Pakistan have ceased. India may boycott future SCO joint military exercises, risking a repeat of its absence in the 2021 drills, which would further weaken tactical coordination among members.

Economic Integration Process Hindered

Currently, aside from the SCO’s economic integration initiatives, which India has consistently opposed, this conflict has first and foremost highlighted the fragility of regional connectivity projects. During the clash, India and Pakistan mutually closed their airspace and land routes to each other, disrupting trade and economic corridors between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even extending to Central Asian countries—these corridors being pillars of the SCO’s economic agenda.

Secondly, the conflict has damaged international investor confidence. It intensified geopolitical risks in South Asia, causing sharp declines in the stock markets of both India and Pakistan. After the conflict, terrorist attacks supported by India within Pakistan surged rapidly, raising the possibility that the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan may further deteriorate, thereby delaying regional economic integration.

Severe Impact on Internal Unity and Escalation of Great Power Rivalry

First, the India-Pakistan conflict has placed Russia in an awkward position. Russia has tried to balance its relations with China—on one hand supporting India’s role in countering China, while on the other hoping for economic support from China following the Ukraine crisis. During the India-Pakistan military conflict, Russia adopted a tacit approval stance toward India.

Second, external interference from the United States and Turkey has weakened the SCO’s cohesion. Following the India-Pakistan conflict, India has strengthened its military cooperation with the United States and grown more estranged from other SCO member states; meanwhile, Turkey’s support for Pakistan against India poses potential impacts on the geopolitical landscape and security situation in Central and South Asia.

Conclusion: The India-Pakistan military conflict has exposed shortcomings in the SCO’s flexibility and crisis response mechanisms, while also presenting an opportunity for transformation. If the SCO can strengthen internal coordination through structural reforms and reduce India’s obstructive influence, it could be upgraded into a core platform for Eurasian security and economic governance. Conversely, if it continues to be constrained by member-state conflicts, its geopolitical influence risks further erosion by Western-led alliance systems.

First, the SCO needs to optimize its decision-making process by reforming the consensus principle and introducing a “qualified majority voting system” in key areas. For economic cooperation projects, approval by two-thirds of the members should suffice to proceed; dissenting members may opt out but must not obstruct progress. Additionally, the Secretariat’s functions should be enhanced, granting it greater agenda-setting power to reduce interference from individual members in daily operations.

Second, the SCO should establish conflict mediation and crisis management mechanisms. A special working group led by China and Russia, including neutral members like Iran and Kazakhstan, could be formed to facilitate India-Pakistan ceasefire negotiations and the restoration of the Indus Waters Treaty; military communication channels should be strengthened and incorporated into the SCO Defense Ministers’ meeting framework, with an India-Pakistan military hotline established to prevent escalation due to miscalculations.

Finally, the functions of regional counterterrorism institutions should be restructured. Introducing third-party investigation mechanisms to independently assess terrorist attacks would reduce mutual accusations among members—for example, Pakistan has labeled India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval as the “mastermind” of terrorism within Pakistan.

Russia is a key stakeholder in SCO reforms. Eurasia, including the SCO, is Russia’s strategic heartland. If Russia wants the SCO to thrive, it must take measures to compel India to choose cooperation or leave.

India frequently resorts to unreasonable demands and diplomatic blackmail during major Chinese-hosted diplomatic events. Given India’s consistent behavior, the Chinese government need not be concerned about whether Modi attends the Tianjin summit. Instead, China should continue to launch initiatives favorable to regional cooperation and SCO development, while promoting internal reforms that serve the organization’s long-term interests.