How China Reads Hegseth’s Remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue

Zhou Bo, The China Academy, June 1, 2026 ―

“A constructive relationship of strategic stability,” as described by Hegseth after the China–U.S. leaders’ meeting, suggests a subtle shift in U.S. thinking.

Guancha.cn: At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, the United States — deeply entangled in the turmoil in the Middle East — was undoubtedly the most closely watched participant. We all saw U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s speech, in which he mentioned the words “strong, quiet, clear” four times, seemingly signaling a shift in U.S. defense policy toward a more pragmatic realism. Hegseth also said that “those who long for peace must prepare for war.” From your perspective, what kind of signal was the United States sending? And how exactly might it transform?

Zhou Bo: I think this year’s speech by the U.S. defense secretary was the lowest-key address delivered by an American defense chief in the history of the forum. I’ve attended the Shangri-La Dialogue 13 times, and based on my experience, this speech was actually not surprising.

Trump had just completed his visit to China, and together with changes in America’s global position and the ongoing war in the Middle East, all of these factors shaped his remarks. In his speech, he repeatedly emphasized the three keywords “strong, quiet, clear.” But these three words are actually very difficult to define. Take “clear,” for example — clear in what sense? Clear in its assessment of the situation, or something else? Judging from reality, the United States itself does not appear to have a clear grasp of the current situation. No one can explain why Trump chose to take military action against Iran. Can that really be called “clear”?

Then there is “strong.” The United States is still the world’s foremost military power, and in terms of hard power it can indeed be described as strong. But it is equally obvious that its strength is now showing signs of decline. Official U.S. strategic reports have proposed pulling back its strategic focus to the Western Hemisphere, which in itself reflects insufficient capability. The United States still wants to play the role of the “world’s policeman,” but it is already struggling to do so.

There’s a Chinese saying: good steel should be used on the blade’s edge. The United States has chosen to first refocus on its own neighborhood, but at the same time it has not completely retreated to its own doorstep. Washington understands very clearly that the Indo-Pacific is currently the world’s most economically dynamic and prosperous region, and also the focal point of global attention. The United States therefore still wants to share in the dividends of the region’s growth.

At the same time, the global geopolitical landscape is continuing to shift from West to East. The Munich Security Conference — whose stature is even higher than that of the Shangri-La Dialogue — had already set the tone two or three years ago by arguing that the world is entering a phase of “de-Westernization.” This “de-Westernization” is not only taking place in the non-Western world, but also within the West itself. One consequence of this trend is that the global geopolitical center of gravity is tilting ever more rapidly toward the Asia-Pacific. I think the United States is ultimately more concerned with ensuring that the West itself remains strong — remains “strong.” Hegseth also said in his speech that empty slogans alone are not enough; they must be backed by real strength.

The most difficult word to interpret is “quiet.” The word can mean silence, but it can also be understood as calmness or composure. But how could the world’s leading superpower possibly describe itself as “quiet”? More likely, it means speaking softly while carrying a big stick, in line with Theodore Roosevelt’s old doctrine.

This rhetoric may appear to reflect a certain sense of restraint, almost a deliberate lowering of tone. But judging from the actual behavior of the current U.S. administration, this so-called restraint has not truly materialized. Washington speaks of scaling back its defense strategy, yet in practice it continues to launch proactive actions abroad. There are even constant rumors circulating in Washington that Cuba could become the next target.

Guancha.cn: Against the backdrop of the recent meeting between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state, what do you think these three words mean for the future of China–U.S. relations? And how should China respond?

Zhou Bo: Western media generally did not rate Trump’s visit to China very highly. All the commentary I read said that the visit achieved limited results, that the two sides reached no consensus, and issued no joint statement. But in my view, this interpretation is completely wrong — this was actually a visit of historical significance.

People often mention that the visit focused on the “five Bs,” referring to beef, soybeans, Boeing aircraft, as well as trade and investment commissions. The first three are straightforward, involving tangible trade cooperation. But I think the latter two are more important. With mechanisms such as the trade and investment commission in place, absurd measures like imposing 145% tariffs on China can be handled through dedicated channels of coordination. In the future, both sides are more likely to resolve trade frictions within a normalized framework, which is undoubtedly a positive development.

However, the most important outcome of this visit was the consensus reached by the two heads of state on establishing a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”. Let’s start with “constructive.” This term mainly reflects how both sides view the future of the relationship. But whether this vision can truly be implemented remains uncertain. That is also why the Chinese side specifically emphasized the need to avoid letting “constructive” become an empty slogan. The implication is that if the other side is not serious, it could indeed end up as nothing more than rhetoric.

Looking again at “strategic stability,” this is a phrase with significant depth. It is the first time the U.S. government has formally acknowledged that China and the United States stand on an equal footing. After all, when there is a vast disparity in power, one cannot meaningfully speak of “strategic stability.” This formulation is, first and foremost, an acknowledgment of China’s strength — and a positive framing of it.

Since Trump’s first term, the U.S. has used various labels for China — whether as a competitor, a strategic challenger, or even a mounting threat. None of these were favorable. Against this backdrop, defining the relationship as one of “strategic stability” lays an important foundation for how the two countries will manage their interactions going forward.

“Strategic stability” itself is a rather subtle concept. Ordinary interpretations might assume it simply means the two sides are roughly matched and therefore stable. But in reality, the concept is far richer. During the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union used the term, it mainly referred to rough parity in nuclear arsenals. Earlier, the Chinese and Russian heads of state jointly stated that “strategic balance” should not be reduced to mere military parity, especially in nuclear capability.

Today, whether in U.S.–China or Russia–China contexts, “strategic stability” is understood in a broader sense, grounded in great-power relations and encompassing a much wider scope.

From a purely military perspective, China is not seeking to match the United States in nuclear weapons numbers. But in areas such as space, artificial intelligence, and cyberspace, the gap between the two sides is already not large, and these domains require stronger communication and coordination. Taken together, mutual checks and balances across multiple fields are what constitute genuine military stability. Beyond the military sphere, strategic stability also extends to politics, economics, and every dimension of national development — a comprehensive, system-wide equilibrium.