While the war on Iran dominates the debate in Turkiye, other foreign policy developments are unfolding in parallel. Unlike other NATO members and the Persian Gulf states, Ankara has not taken an openly anti-Iran position in the war. It has avoided accusatory language toward Tehran.
At the same time, by placing responsibility on Israel, Ankara has avoided directly naming the US and President Donald Trump as the main drivers of the war, while also taking a series of significant steps that point toward a new phase of integration with the west.
The first was the decision to establish, for the first time in Turkiye, a multinational corps under NATO command. The second, though not formally tied to NATO, was the decision to establish a Maritime Component Command in Istanbul under the International Task Force linked to Europe’s plans for Ukraine.
Why, then, has the Turkish government under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan both avoided angering Trump and moved toward steps that amount to a far deeper integration with the west? What do these moves mean for Turkiye and for Erdogan’s political future?
A fragile economy and fear of Trump
The war launched by the US–Israeli alliance against Iran has produced consequences that go far beyond the region. The clearest arena where this can be seen is the economy.
Iran’s use of the Strait of Hormuz card to stop imperial aggression aimed to shake the global economy through energy production, energy supply, and energy prices. It worked.
When attacks on energy facilities in the Persian Gulf states were added to the Hormuz threat, natural gas and oil prices rose rapidly. That, in turn, triggered inflationary pressures worldwide and caused serious disruption to global supply chains.
According to experts, the impact of the war on Iran on the world economy will be greater and more damaging than the 1973 oil crisis. Countries such as Turkiye, which depend heavily on energy imports and have fragile economies, will be hit much harder.
The decline in Turkish Central Bank reserves during the war shows this clearly.
In recent weeks, Turkish media has intensely debated the dramatic fall in central bank reserves. With the outbreak of war, there was a rapid outflow of hot money from Turkiye. To prevent a currency shock caused by rising demand for foreign currency, the Central Bank sold part of its gold reserves, bought foreign currency, and injected some of it into the market.
Critical economists in Turkiye wrote that the central bank sold close to 50 tons of gold, marking the sharpest fall in reserves since 17 August 2018.
What happened on 17 August 2018?
Critical political scientists immediately recalled a social media post from Trump during his first term in office.
Andrew Brunson, a US evangelical pastor, had been detained in Turkiye in connection with the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. During his election campaign, Trump had promised Brunson would be released.
While Brunson’s trial was still underway, Trump posted on social media that if the pastor was not freed, he would destroy the Turkish economy with “large sanctions.” On the same day, the Turkish lira plunged against the dollar, and Turkiye experienced one of the biggest currency shocks in recent years.
Nearly eight years later, the central bank once again found itself forced to take extraordinary measures and sell tons of gold to prevent another currency crisis.
But the “precautions” did not stop there.
Erdogan was deeply satisfied to see former US president Joe Biden leave office and Trump return. This time, unlike Trump’s first term, Erdogan would do nothing that might anger him.
Anyone following Turkish politics closely can see this. Since the Iran war began, both Erdogan and government officials have said almost nothing about the role of the US and Trump in the conflict. Instead, they have consistently pointed to Israel as the main culprit.
In his latest remarks to parliament, Erdogan again referred to Israel and said: “It has become clear who is profiting from this war.” According to this narrative, both the launch of the war and the effort to draw Trump into it were the work of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government.
In that sense, Ankara argues that stopping Israel is the only way to end the war.
Still, it is best to view the current positioning of Turkiye and Israel through the lens of pragmatism. Both states remain part of the Atlantic alliance. The possibility of direct war between them in the short term remains extremely low.
The sharp rhetoric used by Netanyahu and Erdogan is largely aimed at dominating domestic politics and consolidating their respective political bases.
Erdogan’s silence toward Trump is equally unsurprising.
After winning the 2023 elections, Erdogan appointed Mehmet Simsek, one of the leading representatives of neoliberal economic orthodoxy in Turkiye, to head the economy. Simsek then launched a stabilization program aimed at reducing inflation.
The main condition for that program to function is maintaining good relations with the US and Europe and ensuring the continued flow of western capital into Turkiye.
Only under those conditions can the exchange rate remain stable and inflation fall.
Losing power at home, seeking legitimacy abroad
The issue is not only economic.
As Erdogan steadily loses mass support and faces a crisis of hegemony at home, he has increasingly sought the backing of the west, particularly Trump, in order to preserve his rule.
During this process, the S-400 missile systems previously purchased from Russia were quietly pushed off the agenda. Turkiye had been expelled from the F-35 program because of those missiles, and efforts have now begun to return to the program.
Following the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Turkiye positioned itself as the patron of the new self-appointed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa (the former ISIS commander who went by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Julani) and as a subcontractor for the US. Trump, in turn, gave Erdogan room to maneuver in Syria, bringing bilateral relations to a new level.
So much so that Tom Barrack, the US ambassador appointed by Trump, said last year, “President Trump says … let’s give them what they need … legitimacy.”
Trump himself has repeatedly praised Erdogan and signaled his desire to maintain good relations with him.
At the same time, Ankara has set itself the goal of becoming part of Europe’s emerging security architecture, especially as relations between the US and Europe continue to deteriorate.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has repeatedly stressed this point, stating in February of last year: “If Europe’s security architecture will be reshaped, it is impossible to do so without Turkiye. An approach excluding Turkiye, a military power like Turkiye, will not be very realistic.”
Within this framework, Turkiye has tried to strengthen its position inside NATO while also signaling that it is prepared to support the construction of a European security apparatus in which the US plays a diminished role.
Britain, Germany, and France have all indicated that they value the contribution Turkiye can make to European security.
Against that backdrop, the missile incidents that Ankara claimed were aimed at Turkiye during Iran’s retaliation against US and Israeli strikes take on added significance.
In four separate cases in early March, the Turkish Defense Ministry issued statements that avoided harsh rhetoric toward Tehran but emphasized that Turkiye was protected by NATO’s presence in the eastern Mediterranean.
Public debate in Turkiye focused on claims that the missiles were intercepted outside Turkish airspace, possibly in space, and may have been directed at Cyprus. This fueled speculation about a ‘false flag’ operation.
In contacts with Iran, the two sides agreed to establish a joint commission.
Soon afterward, however, developments that strengthened the Turkiye–west axis drew attention.
The first was the project to establish a new NATO-linked multinational corps in Adana, where Incirlik Air Base is located. The second was the Maritime Component Command in Istanbul, which, while not formally under NATO, would still carry an international character.
Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkiye’s ruling classes have always viewed the alliance as an anchor in relations with the west. NATO has long been seen as the most effective vehicle for integration.
The multinational corps planned for Adana appears aimed at deepening that integration even further.
Given that such corps typically include between 20,000 and 80,000 troops, this would mark the first time in Turkish history that thousands of foreign soldiers are stationed on Turkish soil.
More importantly, the main target of this corps appears to be Russia. Over the long term, that will inevitably have negative consequences for Turkiye’s relations with its neighbor.
This year’s NATO summit will be held in Turkiye in July, and the decisions taken there are likely to be highly significant in shaping Turkiye’s place and importance within the alliance.
The Maritime Component Command in Istanbul is not formally a NATO initiative, but it is difficult to separate it from NATO.
In January 2026, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a declaration of intent to establish a 100,000-strong international task force in Ukraine.
After the meeting in Paris, Macron said: “I want to salute our German, Italian, and Polish friends, and especially I want to emphasize the importance of Turkiye’s role in the maritime domain. Turkiye has a really important role here and has taken on this entire responsibility.”
It is therefore possible to see the Maritime Component Command as part of that agreement and as an attempt by Europe to enter the Black Sea in a position openly hostile to Russia.
When these two developments are combined with Turkiye’s membership in Trump’s Gaza “Board of Peace” – which presents itself as a kind of alternative UN – and Ankara’s role in pushing for Hamas disarmament, the military dimension of the picture becomes complete.
The Turkish ruling class and the Erdogan government are trying to create a new bargaining framework with the US and Europe through military alliances.
In return, they are demanding support for their own political survival.
Deepening dependence: What comes next?
To complete the picture, it is necessary to move beyond the military dimension and return once again to political economy.
The Turkish economy is deeply dependent on international capitalism through the financial sector, exports and imports, debt mechanisms, foreign funds, and hot money flows.
Over the past 25 years, no serious attempt has been made to reduce that dependence or build a more independent economic model. Turkiye has not embarked on a serious path of industrialization or development.
Now, in an effort to compensate for that failure, Turkiye is being reshaped into a paradise of cheap and precarious labor for international capital.
Trade union struggles are being suppressed. Companies are being granted mining privileges. New energy corridor projects are being prepared.
In other words, Turkiye’s rulers increasingly see deeper integration into imperial structures – from the economy to security – as the most rational path both for themselves and for the future of the country.
Today, broad sections of society are deeply angry with the government because of the economic crisis. The opposition has also begun to raise calls for early elections more forcefully.
Yet it cannot be said that the opposition has succeeded in becoming a source of hope by offering a genuine alternative to the government’s domestic and foreign policies.
The government, meanwhile, is escalating pressure on the opposition in order to overcome its own crisis of rule and turn Turkiye into a country without meaningful elections.
In doing so, it wants both US and European backing.
It is entering new negotiations with the west and taking steps designed to show that the continuation of Erdogan’s rule remains important for western interests.
Turkiye is therefore passing through a moment of multiple crises, and no one yet knows where they will lead.
The moves made by all sides in the coming period may offer clues about the direction of travel.
For now, however, it is too early to make any definitive judgment.