Bypassing Hormuz: Saudi Arabia’s pipeline push in Yemen’s Al-Mahra
Mawadda Iskandar, The Cradle, February 26,2025 ─
Through the use of Salafi extremists, Saudi Arabia seeks to revive a strategic oil pipeline through Yemen’s Al-Mahra to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and gain hegemony over its Arab neighbors. But fierce local resistance and international power struggles could derail Riyadh’s ambitions.
The rapid military escalation in Yemen’s Al-Mahra governorate – historically untouched by war – ties directly to broader regional shifts. Saudi Arabia’s renewed push to build an oil export pipeline through the Arabian Sea, via Al-Mahra, signals a new chapter in the global battle over energy routes and coastal control.
This effort is more than an economic maneuver; it is a calculated geopolitical play aimed at reshaping power balances in West Asia, with ripple effects far beyond Yemen’s borders.
The Salafi card
Tensions are mounting in the strategically crucial Al-Mahra governorate, the country’s easternmost province, which shares borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. In recent days, public protests have intensified against Saudi Arabia’s recruitment of hard-line Salafi militias under the banner of Dera’ al-Watan (Shield of the Nation), a force supposedly tasked with maintaining security.
Simultaneously, US military trainers have landed at Al-Ghaydah International Airport – converted into a Saudi military base in 2017 – before being transported to Qishn Camp, where Riyadh is training its new armed units.
Speaking to The Cradle, Adel al-Hasani, head of the Forum for Peace to Stop the War in Yemen, explains the importance of Al-Mahra, noting that it is the second-largest governorate in Yemen and shares borders with two countries: Oman via the Shahn and Sarfit crossings, and Saudi Arabia via the Kharkhir border.
“Saudi Arabia has long-standing ambitions in this governorate. It has repeatedly attempted and failed to exert control, using tactics such as recruiting local tribes and granting citizenship to many residents. The kingdom has also sought to build an oil pipeline through Al-Mahra to the Arabian Sea, insisting that the land the pipeline crosses be considered Saudi territory – a demand that local tribes have rejected.”
Al-Mahra’s significance extends beyond its untapped oil reserves. Its location makes it a prime target for Saudi Arabia, which is eager to construct a pipeline that would reduce its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz – controlled by Iran, through which more than 90 percent of its oil exports currently pass.
Riyadh previously tried to secure a 300-kilometer land corridor under the late Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, offering to manage its logistics and security. This plan failed, but the kingdom has not given up.
Now, it aims to extend oil pipelines from its fields through Kharkhir in Hadramaut, reaching Al-Nashtoon Port in Al-Mahra and ultimately the Arabian Sea – providing Saudi oil exports a vital alternative route beyond Hormuz which is also the sole maritime outlet for Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.
A map showing the route of the oil pipeline Saudi Arabia intends to build that passes through Yemen’s Al-Mahra governorate.
Popular resistance
Saudi Arabia’s latest military gambit in Yemen is part of a broader campaign to tighten its grip on Al-Mahra. Having already seized control of the governorate’s coastline, Riyadh has established surveillance towers, commandeered Al-Nashtoon Port, and deployed naval patrols.
Over the years, it has worked systematically to buy tribal loyalties – offering Saudi citizenship and financial incentives in exchange for local support, including for the controversial oil pipeline.
Yet, this effort has triggered fierce local resistance. Many Al-Mahra residents reject foreign military presence and accuse Saudi Arabia of attempting to “occupy” their region.
Ali Mubarak Mahamed, spokesperson for the Peaceful Sit-in Committee of Al-Mahra – a grassroots movement opposing Saudi influence – tells The Cradle: “Saudi Arabia failed to impose the oil pipeline project due to strong political opposition from our committee and the steadfastness of Al-Mahra’s people, who have prioritized their own interests over external bribes.” He adds:
“Saudi Arabia is now funding and supporting Salafi groups, relocating them from various provinces to Al-Mahra to influence the local population, alter its demographic makeup, and spread sectarianism.”
The Saudis, says Mahamed, “recently deployed militias it created and trained under the name ‘Dera’ al-Watan’ – primarily composed of extremist Salafis – and legitimized their presence through the so-called Presidential Leadership Council.”
Mahamed argues that Saudi Arabia’s strategy aligns with broader US and British interests in Yemen:
“Like any occupying power, Riyadh is using military intervention to push its own agenda. The internationally recognized Yemeni government – operating out of Riyadh – is entirely complicit, legitimizing Saudi control over Al-Mahra.”
He laments that the governorate, once a sanctuary for Yemenis escaping war, is now being dragged into geopolitical turmoil.
A battle among the Persian Gulf’s Arab powers
Saudi Arabia’s ambitions in Al-Mahra intertwine with regional rivalries, particularly involving Qatar and the UAE.
While Doha shares Riyadh’s concerns about potential disruptions to oil shipments through Hormuz, the UAE has already secured an alternative export route via its Habshan-to-Fujairah pipeline, which connects its oil fields to the Gulf of Oman – making it less vulnerable to any blockade of Hormuz.
The strategic value of controlling Yemen’s coastline was a key factor in the Saudi decision to intervene in Yemen’s war. Controlling Yemen’s coasts would allow Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Within this context, Riyadh aims to transform Al-Mahra and Hadramaut into semi-autonomous regions under its influence.
However, Saudi ambitions face resistance from the UAE, which has solidified its grip on the island of Socotra – geographically close to Al-Mahra – turning it into a strategic military hub. Riyadh’s response has been to increase its military presence in Al-Mahra as a counterweight to Abu Dhabi’s influence in Socotra. According to Hasani:
“Saudi Arabia is replicating its military model seen elsewhere, such as in Libya and southern Yemen, by establishing Salafi-dominated military units like the Giants Brigades, Dera’ al-Watan, and the Security Belts – all directly serving Saudi interests.”
He warns that the Dera’ al-Watan force in Al-Mahra, mostly recruited locally, poses a social threat that could destabilize the region’s tribal structure.
But Riyadh’s arrows are not all directed at the UAE. Oman, another key player affected by Saudi expansion in Al-Mahra, is also firmly within Saudi Arabia’s sights. As Hasani notes:
“Saudi control over Al-Mahra exerts significant pressure on Oman by securing its border with the sultanate. This creates a national security risk for Oman, as Saudi Arabia could use this leverage to exert political influence over Muscat.”
Saudi Arabia has long sought to steer Oman away from its traditionally neutral foreign policy, given Muscat’s key geographic impact on any Saudi attempts to blockade Yemen and Riyadh’s competition with the UAE and Qatar.
The Saudis continue to pressure Omanis to support its war in Yemen while attempting to push through the oil pipeline project and impose a military blockade on Al-Mahra’s border.
In response, Oman has strengthened its military presence along its border, set up new security checkpoints, and sought closer ties with Al-Mahra’s tribes to counter Saudi influence.
Power struggles extend beyond Yemen
Saudi Arabia’s actions in Al-Mahra go beyond economic calculations – they reflect a deeper geopolitical agenda aimed at securing its oil exports, consolidating regional power, and outmaneuvering the UAE.
However, these efforts are meeting fierce resistance – not just from local tribes but also from competing Persian Gulf states and wary international players. The future of Al-Mahra remains uncertain.
The region could become the site of prolonged struggles between foreign powers and local opposition, particularly as shifting regional dynamics threaten to redraw the geopolitical map of Yemen and the wider region.