Both sides recalibrate as the Iran–Israel war enters a new phase
Mohamad Hasan Sweidan, The Cradle, July 14, 2025 —
Last month’s ceasefire marked not an end to hostilities, but a shift into a more dangerous, ambiguous phase of the conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Both sides are recalibrating strategies, but the war – covert, cyber, and psychological – is far from over.
The June 2025 12-day war between Iran and the Israeli occupation state tore through decades of covert strikes, red lines, and foreign-managed restraint.
In less than two weeks, Iran’s missiles reached Tel Aviv, and Israeli jets struck deep into Iranian territory, essentially transforming what had long simmered into a direct and public war.
The so-called ceasefire that followed was not a breakthrough, but a breather. Both sides are now repositioning for a long confrontation that will span the region, redraw alliances, and test the limits of US dominance in West Asia.
A clash of agendas in Washington
With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s US visit concluded, Iran policy remains a point of friction between Tel Aviv and Washington. US President Donald Trump, increasingly cautious about further regional entanglements, favors a narrow strategy focused on preventing a nuclear breakout without committing to deeper military engagement.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, returned from Washington pressing for a far more confrontational approach – one that seeks to accelerate internal collapse in the Islamic Republic.
Leaks from the Netanyahu–Trump meetings point to diverging priorities. This divide reflects more than tactical disagreements, signaling opposing political endgames. For Trump, diplomacy is a tool to manage escalation. For Netanyahu, confrontation is the strategy itself. Tel Aviv demands capitulation rather than containment.
Lessons from war
The 12-day war marked the first extended direct military confrontation between Iran and the occupation state. While previous encounters relied on intelligence warfare and proxy clashes, this conflict escalated into full-scale missile and drone exchanges.
Israeli airstrikes targeted nuclear facilities and critical infrastructure deep inside Iran. Meanwhile, Iranian ballistic missiles and drones penetrated Israeli airspace, hitting military and intelligence sites, including in Tel Aviv.
The war shattered long-held assumptions. Iran struck the largest US base in West Asia – Al-Udeid base in Qatar – signaling its willingness to hit Washington directly in response to US strikes on several Iranian nuclear facilities.
The US, for its part, flexed its capacity to engage Iran militarily, but stopped short of prolonged conflict. Both sides, drawing on Thomas Schelling’s “calculated risk” theory, aimed to demonstrate capability and resolve without crossing the threshold into full-blown war.
Drawing on his concept of “cost-equivalence,” Kenneth Waltz’s observation that “War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains,” helps explain why the US backed off. Tehran made clear that a wider American attack would be met with regional retaliation, threatening energy markets and US troops. This reality, more than any pacifist impulse, informed Trump’s pivot to diplomacy.
Three critical lessons emerged:
1. Israel’s limits
Despite initial success, including precision strikes enabled by Mossad’s deep infiltration of Iranian intelligence, the occupation state failed to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. Iran exposed the weaknesses of Israel’s much-touted multi-layered missile defense.
A sustained missile barrage overwhelmed the Iron Dome and its counterparts, proving that Tel Aviv cannot strike with impunity. As Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) admitted, Iran can “inflict significant damage on Israel in return,” despite its technological superiority.
2. Iran’s vulnerabilities
Tehran, too, identified weaknesses – particularly in air defense and internal security. The Islamic Republic is now expected to expedite its acquisition of advanced Russian or Chinese defense systems, tighten internal counter-intelligence, and bolster the resilience of its missile systems.
3. Washington’s red lines
The war reminded Israeli leaders that American political and military support – or its withdrawal – could determine how far Israel would go against Iran. The Trump administration, while sympathetic to Israel’s broader goals, clearly wanted to avoid a prolonged war.
After assisting Israel in striking Iranian nuclear facilities, Trump effectively bought himself a “soft exit” by declaring the mission accomplished and pushing for a ceasefire. This, according to INSS, meant that Washington might use force to stop an Iranian nuclear breakout, but not to overthrow the Iranian government or wage an open war on Israel’s behalf.
Tel Aviv’s long war strategy
Post-ceasefire, Israel’s strategic objective remains constant: undermine Iran’s rise, thwart its nuclear and regional ambitions, and foster conditions for internal collapse. But Tel Aviv knows another major war could backfire.
Thus, covert operations are once again front and center. Mossad’s wartime assassinations of over a dozen senior Iranian scientists demonstrate the scale and precision of these efforts. Cyber sabotage, too, has intensified, with operations designed to sow fear and uncertainty within Iranian institutions. Tehran’s post-war crackdown – including hundreds of espionage arrests – suggests awareness of the growing threat.
Airstrikes may also resume sporadically, mimicking the “mowing the grass” approach used against Hamas and Hezbollah. These are calibrated to destroy rebuilt infrastructure while avoiding all-out war. Yet, each strike risks retaliation and wider escalation, especially if US red lines are crossed.
Cyberwarfare, with its deniability and disruptive power, is an increasingly central pillar. But it is a double-edged sword: Iran’s growing cyber arsenal, demonstrated during and after the war, threatens critical Israeli systems.
Tel Aviv may also invest in stirring internal unrest inside Iran. This includes bolstering opposition groups and exploiting ethnic tensions in restive provinces like Ahvaz, Balochistan, Western Kurdistan, and Azeri-majority areas. However, the war temporarily unified Iranian society around the state, limiting the effectiveness of these schemes.
The occupation state aims to prolong the confrontation without triggering a regional conflagration – bleeding Iran slowly through assassinations, cyber strikes, and psychological warfare.
The goal is not victory through battle, but collapse through exhaustion akin to ‘boiling the frog’: grind down Iran’s defences, unravel its alliances, and wait for the pressure to fracture the state from within.
Tehran adapts
For Iran, the war served as a wake-up call. The post-ceasefire phase is not peace, but rearmament and recalibration. While Tehran lacks Israel’s intelligence footprint in occupied Palestine, it has other tools.
Domestically, the Islamic Republic has intensified its crackdown on infiltration with over 700 espionage arrests, six Mossad agents executed, and new legislation imposing the death penalty for aiding the occupation state, the US, and their allies as tantamount to “corruption on earth.” The Iranian nation is fortifying itself.
In cyberspace, Iran’s arsenal is becoming formidable. Thousands of hacked Israeli documents, data leaks on occupation soldiers, sabotage of radar and surveillance systems, and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure marked a qualitative leap. Tehran can now strike deep inside Israel without launching a single missile.
Regionally, Iran will lean into the familiar territory of asymmetric deterrence. This includes backing resistance allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, enhancing missile accuracy and air defenses, and continuing cyber pressure. Tehran’s aim is to raise the cost of Israeli aggression while avoiding direct escalation – until it is ready.
The war has shifted from overt confrontation to a battle of attrition and intelligence. Neither side has emerged victorious. But both are preparing for the next round.